

# PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A FORCE XXI MULTIPLIER

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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Aviation**



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1. The first group of people who are interested in the results of the study are the researchers themselves. They want to know if the study was successful in achieving its objectives and if the results are consistent with their expectations.

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## Abstract

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This monograph discusses an often overlooked and much maligned source of information and potential force multiplier -- Public Affairs. While reporting activities on the battlefield is not a recent development, technological advances in the past decade have moved war correspondents from the realm of recent historians to current events reporters. Although the origins of war reporting date back to ancient times, this paper focuses on American experiences. Journalists reported widely our revolution. During the Civil War, the U. S. press and military made their first attempts to cooperate. By World War II, motion picture films replayed scenes of great devastation in theaters throughout America. Vietnam is considered by many a watershed for military-media relations. Now, nearly instantaneous satellite communications links have all but removed the military's ability to conduct security reviews on media products, other than at the source. The INTERNET and other worldwide communications systems have opened new channels of horizontal information distribution that only herald things to come in the next quarter century.

Today's Army Public Affairs structure in our divisions and corps falls markedly short of meeting the challenges of dealing effectively with the news media and completing its other missions (command information and community relations, for example). Significant personnel plus-ups are not likely, but state-of-the-art technology, readily available, can lessen the burdens on the public affairs professionals in tactical units. The most significant assistance that public affairs can receive is from leaders at all levels integrating public affairs operations into training, education and exercises.

The uncertainty of our Army's missions in the coming years may be cause for debate about the number of tanks, helicopters or howitzers needed to achieve decisive victory. But whether the mission is traditional war or peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts or domestic support operations, the U.S. and international media will be there. The Army's public affairs efforts must be capable of conducting a coordinated media plan while simultaneously conducting command information programs for the soldiers in theater and their loved ones back home. This basic necessity of dealing using all available media to tell our army's story will drive PA structure and doctrine in the 21st century.

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
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
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## **Chapter 1**

### **Antagonists or Allies?**

The news media and the military. The juxtaposition of few other professions causes such emotional reactions. On the subject of information dissemination, the media and the military are often seen as opposites -- the former seeking full, potentially embarrassing reports, while the latter looks to obfuscate, censor and classify. When polled about the professionalism of members of the two vocations, Americans habitually rate the military more trustworthy. Yet those same Americans turn to the media for virtually all their information on their military. Fewer and fewer Americans have served in the military (including our Congressmen and reporters), and the public must rely on news accounts to inform them of how their tax dollars are being spent by the Defense Department.

The history of conflict between the American military and the media dates back to at least the Civil War; arguably the roots of the tension were sown during the American Revolution. While the tension has, for all intents and purposes, existed for all conflicts in which American forces participated, the Vietnam War marks a particularly troublesome period. The disillusionment with the media and betrayal felt by the average young soldier during Vietnam played a significant role in the formulation of recent and current public affairs policy.

Army public affairs responsibilities include operations of three basic types: command (or internal) information, community relations and public information. These functions have begun to blur as the methods of reaching the internal audience mirror the

means of speaking to the community and the rest of the public. That these operations are more difficult to separate is the focus of a discussion in the Final Draft version of the newest Army Public Affairs Operations manual, Field Manual 46-1.<sup>1</sup>

This monograph will concern itself primarily with the function of public information (also known as media relations). When applicable, internal information (as the new draft FM 46-1 terms it) will be addressed. While the focus of this monograph is on wartime media relations, it is in no way meant to imply that the other public affairs functions are not important, merely that they are outside the scope of this paper.

This paper will trace the lineage of military correspondents from the American Revolution through Operation Desert Storm. It will demonstrate the growing tension between the military and the press as the time between battle and publication (later airing) grew shorter and shorter. It will then attempt to diagnose the root of military-media relations problems and offer recommendations to deal with the challenges presented by the existential and anticipated media environments. The Army has recognized the potential a sound, coordinated public affairs plan offers, and included it in its new doctrine. But the momentum must continue and much more is still needed.

There is no "silver bullet" to fixing this problem. But there is also no question that public affairs can be a combat multiplier during information age war, bolstering support, keeping soldiers informed and denying the enemy the ability to influence world opinion with propaganda. Technology today demands effective, credible public affairs operations.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Department of the Army, *Public Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 46-1, Final Draft, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1, 1996), 20.

## Chapter 2

### The History of War Correspondents and Army Public Affairs

Writers have long covered the events of war from the battlefield. While it is not the intent of this monograph to detail the precise history of war correspondence, it is important to understand how today's tension between the military and the media has evolved since antiquity; it is clearly not a new phenomenon. Throughout time, men and women have always documented the wars of their nations. Limited primarily by technology for speed of dissemination, media representatives have long shared the battlefield with soldiers. The relationship has been anything but a heaven-made marriage.

History is replete with examples of war writings from even ancient battles. Thucydides' classic *History of the Peloponnesian War* is a first person account of that war in 431 B.C., albeit written after the end of the war.<sup>1</sup> For the next 2,000 years, reporting continued to provide descriptions of war, but only after the battles had ended. The invention of the "modern" printing presses with movable type -- like the one Gutenberg introduced in the 1440's<sup>2</sup> -- closed the time delay between events and reports. However, quick reporting is relative. In colonial America, for example, an active, free press quickly transitioned to war footage as the Revolution approached, but it contended still with technical limitations.

#### **The American Revolution: Free (not Unbiased) Press**

*"... The body of [British] troops in the meantime, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smith, had crossed the river and landed at Phipp's Farm. They immediately, to the number of 1,000, proceeded to Lexington, about six miles below Concord, with great silence. A company of militia, of about 80 men, mustered near*

*the meeting house; the troops came in sight of them just before sunrise. The militia, upon seeing the troops, began to disperse. The troops then set out upon the run, hallooing and hussaing, and coming within a few rods of them, the commanding officer accosted the militia, in words to this effect, "Disperse, you damn'd rebels -- damn you, disperse."*

*Upon which the troops again hussaed and immediately one or two of the officers discharged their pistols, which were instantaneously followed by the firing of four or five of the soldiers; and then there seemed to be a general discharge from the whole body. Eight of our men were killed and nine wounded. ..."*<sup>3</sup> Isaiah Thomas, at the Battle of Lexington

These vivid images of the first battle of the Revolution provide the first reason that correspondents need access to military operations: to write history of war from the people's perspective. This early battle report demonstrates that the history of war -- the stark, searing accounts of life and death struggles -- provides the public with a picture of the military in action -- *colored by the writer's biases*. The ability of a free press (which, as Thomas proved, is not necessarily an unbiased one) to report on our military and provide information to the general public, is a cornerstone of the media's existence.

But this story, heralding the start of the American Revolution, took six weeks to reach Savannah.<sup>4</sup> While local papers readily carried the news in New England, slow travel between the northern and southern colonies hampered dissemination. This most notable account of the battle was written by Isaiah Thomas, a pioneer of the free press in America. Thomas, who had spent years attempting to publish a non-partisan paper, came down clearly on the side of the Radicals -- the American Revolutionaries.

While the Thomas account demonstrates the need -- and even desirability -- to have journalists present during battles to provide information to the public, it also reveals the first danger: encroachment upon operations security (OPSEC). Even this short excerpt of Thomas's article indicates troop strength, disposition and to some degree,

intent of the opposing forces. In these Revolutionary times when reports such as this took weeks to reach distant readers, the press only revealed the potential for OPSEC problems. Because OPSEC violations were not, in fact, a tactical or operational concern, and the Radicals believed that a “free press was supposed to be an instrument of liberty enabling a scattered people to make common cause against oppression, ... the issue of whether or not to restrain the press seldom arose.”<sup>5</sup>

Significantly, battlefield reporters of the American Revolution had established themselves firmly in the mosaic known as war. Accepted by the American military, these journalists documented the war for posterity. But as the gap between reporting and publication narrowed, the government’s laissez faire attitude about the press waned. America’s next great military crisis, its Civil War, would see the objectives of the military and the press diverge.

### The Civil War: Telegraphs and Photographs

*Hancock was wounded; Gibbon succeeded to command -- approved soldier, and ready for the crisis. As the tempest of fire approached its height, he walked along the line, and renewed his orders to the men to reserve their fire. The rebels -- three lines deep came steadily up. They were in pointblank range.*

*At last the order came! From thrice six thousand guns there came a sheet of smoky flame, a crash of leaden death. The line literally melted away; but there came a second, resistless still. It had been our supreme effort -- on the instant we were not equal to another.*

*Up to the rifle pits, across them, over the barricades -- the momentum of their charge, the mere machine strength of their combined action swept them on. Our thin line could fight, but it had not weight enough to oppose this momentum. It was pushed behind the guns. Right on came the rebels. They were upon the guns, were bayoneting the gunners, were waving flags above our pieces.*

*But they had penetrated to the fatal point.*<sup>6</sup> Whitefield Reid, *New York Tribune*, at the Battle of Gettysburg



The first significant technological change in war reporting was the advent of the telegraph. Samuel Morse first displayed the capabilities of his invention in 1844, sending a message from Washington DC to Baltimore. Within two years, newspapers were using the telegraph to report the Mexican War. The 2,000 mile news link to Washington -- which also included steam ships, railroads and the pony express -- often provided news to our nation's leaders ahead of word received through official channels.<sup>7</sup> In fact, "the government learned of the [peace] treaty [ending the war] through the press."<sup>8</sup> Despite its first use in covering the events of a foreign war in Mexico, the bulk of Americans became familiar with the telegraph as a means to provide nearly current reports of battle during the American Civil War. Coupled with hand-carved engravings used to print artists' depictions of battles (the process to include still photographs in newspapers was not perfected until after the war), circulations soared. Personal, eyewitness reports flooded newsrooms across America.

The account above reflects Reid's familiarity with and empathy for the Union soldiers he accompanied. Over time, history shows this kinship between the journalist and the unit consistently provides more balanced media coverage. It also reveals the beginnings of "information overload." As more and more journalists went off to the cities and battlefields to report the war, they swamped their publications with journalistic copy. The telegraph had enabled reporters to send news to their bureaus in such volume that newspapers were soon overwhelmed with copy and accompanying art work. Despite improvements in printing technology, enabling publishers to print more copies faster, in time, editors had no choice but to print only highlights and briefs of the long, flowing

prose submitted from the field. Perhaps the precursor to the Cable News Network's "Headline News," these briefs evolved into the familiar newspaper headlines we know today.<sup>9</sup>

It is in the Civil War, then, that the dichotomy of long stories versus limited space originated. While reporters like Reid spent months, even years in the field with units, few of the idiosyncrasies would now be carried in the "immediate media," the newspaper. Magazine writers, however, continued to print long, feature stories. Coupled with photographers, who with their need for an unobstructed view of the battlefield, added a new dimension to military dealings with the media: accommodating the different needs of different media.

While photographs could not yet be printed in newspapers, photographs nonetheless had a great impact on the U.S. public. The famous photographer, Matthew Brady, persuaded President Lincoln to allow him to "make a photographic record of the war:

Soon Brady's little black wagon, which was his portable dark room, was a familiar sight on the active fronts. He had an uncanny knack of knowing where the fighting would start. Soldiers dreaded the sight of Brady arriving on the scene, for they knew that soon thereafter the shooting would begin. He was often under sniper fire as he set up his camera at exposed vantage points. By the end of the war he had collected about 3,500 photographs.<sup>10</sup>

This passage conjures up the scene at the beach in Mogadishu, where Navy SEALs and Marine reconnaissance landed amid scores of latter-day Bradys. Dreading the exposure brought about by the lights of the television cameras, SEALs and Marines, as the Yanks and Rebs 100 years prior, went on with their missions. It did not take long for journalists such as Brady, to find themselves unwanted in military circles.

The telegraph and faster printing techniques also caused the first military-media security problems. Whereas during the Revolution, printed reports took days or weeks to get into circulation, telegraph lines often carried reports of battles while the armies contested the ground. These reports could be in print the next day. Because each side found intercepting telegraph transmissions relatively easy, the Civil War was the test bed for media restrictions.

It seems the battles fought between the Union and Confederacy were not the only ground contested during the war. Censorship reared its ugly head in America. In July, 1861, General Winfield Scott, Commander of the Union armies, forbade telegraph companies from transmitting "any information of a military nature."<sup>11</sup> This decree included all telegraph and postal correspondence that the enemy could conceivably intercept. One month later, General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, held a press conference in Washington DC and persuaded the attending media representatives to voluntarily agree to pass no militarily useful information to the enemy. (This signed, formal agreement is considered the forbear of the ground rules the media must endorse currently.) Unfortunately, interagency rivalries (between the Departments of State and War) led to overzealous censorship, and newsmen sought to avoid the unfair truncation of work that had little to no military significance.<sup>12</sup>

Subsequently, the War Department took unilateral control of the censorship, requiring reporters to submit copy to the provost marshal for review. When a reporter for the *New York Herald* violated the pre-transmission review requirements, General William T. Sherman had the man arrested as a spy.<sup>13</sup> The reporter, Thomas W. Knox, escaped

punishment and was acquitted because, “... the court-martial could hardly have hanged him for conveying information to the enemy in a letter printed nearly three weeks after the engagement.”<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, the incident led to the accreditation procedures still in use, requiring news media representatives to be formally recognized by the command in order to receive any assistance from the military.

Technology had pervaded military operations and changed forever the relationship between soldiers and war correspondents. According to Paul Aswell in his monograph, “Wartime Press Censorship by the U.S. Armed Forces,” increases in the number and types of media representatives and technological improvements during the Civil War “caused leaders of both sides to implement widespread control of the press. The issue ... was the conflicting requirements of traditional U.S. press freedom versus the requirements of a government managing a war.”<sup>15</sup>

For the most part, the press abided by even the most stringent rules enforced by the military during the war, fully respecting the need for OPSEC. But during America’s participation in operations in the Philippines only 40 years later, journalists fumed as censorship “evolved more into a method to prevent criticism of the conduct of the counterinsurgency effort than an effort to protect military secrets.”<sup>16</sup>

This fundamental shift from censorship for security to censorship to avoid criticism lies at the heart of military-media disagreements, and is among the most significant new aspects of relations with the press during the Civil War. The military severely limited the topics about which journalists could write and imposed strict guidelines upon the press, which, if not followed, would lead to expulsion from the theater of war.

Involuntary censorship, however, proved to be a double-edged sword; the more brutally applied, the more violently opposed. Clearly the government and the military required better procedures to harness the power of the media during wartime.

### **The World Wars: Voluntary Censorship**

*"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander."* T.E. Lawrence, 1916<sup>17</sup>

*"Don't tell them anything. When it's over, tell them who won."* Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, 1942<sup>18</sup>

World War I brought with it new approaches to both shape limits to "acceptable" news and facilitate propaganda. President Wilson, realizing that previous governmental and military attempts to control the media during war had been unsuccessful, formed the Committee on Public Information one week after the declaration of war on Germany.<sup>19</sup> He charged noted journalist George Creel, the committee's director, with disseminating facts about the war and coordinating government propaganda efforts. In effect, Creel's committee functioned somewhat like today's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs [ASD(PA)] Office. Creel saw his first job as limiting the amount and types of information newspapers should *exclude* from print -- primarily specific troop movements, shipping schedules and other specific military events. He asked publishers to censor themselves voluntarily, something they did "generally ... beyond Creel's minimum requests."<sup>20</sup> These voluntary guidelines applied only to media outlets in the United States. Rules for journalists in the theater of war differed substantially.<sup>21</sup> Even though printed and circulated throughout the military and media communities, the rules were unevenly

enforced. Not unlike today, senior leaders were among the most confused (or simply biased):

Oftentimes [sic] generals and admirals were in sharp disagreement as to what should be suppressed or passed, so that rulings flatly contradicted each other. One group of high officials, with some appreciation of publicity values, would urge pictures and feature stories, while another group would not want to admit that we had either an army or a navy.<sup>22</sup>

Invoking the "accreditation" policy originated during the Civil War, the War Department made even getting to the theater of war a difficult task. Correspondents, appearing before the Secretary of War, had to swear to "convey the truth" yet "refrain from disclosing facts which might aid the enemy."<sup>23</sup> In France, the censorship was not voluntary (reporters signed ground rule agreements), but American reporters clung to their nationalism and generally abided by the censors' rulings while describing the action in terms favorable to the American fighters.<sup>24</sup> Yet censors squelched stories portraying the troops in a "bad light," even if the articles contained no operationally sensitive information. By 1918, two things resulted: first, the American Expeditionary Forces eased restrictions on reporters in theater because of widespread discontent and abuses, and second, and more importantly, reporters found ways around the censors, often risking their jobs and jail time in so doing.<sup>25</sup>

This tension between the military and the media continued into World War II, when again, the White House appointed a well-respected media man to perform liaison with the publishers and producers. This time, it was Byron Price, the Executive News Editor of the Associated Press, who was given the title, "Director of Censorship."<sup>26</sup> Again, inside the U.S., news agencies accepted voluntary restrictions, while their correspondents abroad were forced to agree to direct censorship. Price, as the President's

personal agent, published voluntary censorship guidelines for both the press and the new commercial news medium, radio.<sup>27</sup> Censorship was not easy -- censors contended with the demands for increased speed because of radio, and the sheer volume of information the 1,646 accredited newsmen produced.<sup>28</sup>

Additionally, as the types of media varied and diverged (reporters for newspapers had been joined by magazine feature writers, wire services, film crews and radio reporters) the military found itself needing to provide different information -- and information-gathering opportunities -- to the members of each group. For example, while newspaper reporters may desire a short summary of a battle or operation, historians, magazine writers and photographers often require much different, much more thorough information. Also, headquarters' "photo opportunities" take place away from front line stories, thus requiring greater time from the leaders and their media liaisons who must attend both. The diversity of types of media representatives has only grown as time goes on, and each medium requires different contact with combat units and their leaders.<sup>29</sup>

The effectiveness of wartime censorship was substantial. Clearly, Germany had been denied important information about U.S. production capabilities, our intent to conduct landings in North Africa and France, as well as the development of the atomic bomb.<sup>30</sup> Significant issues censored in the Pacific theater were the lack of success of Japanese depth charges and the success of kamikaze missions. On the censorship of kamikazes: "The pilot who was successful in his mission did not return. Higher authority who sent him on his perilous task had no way of knowing whether he succeeded or failed unless we informed him."<sup>31</sup> Operational concerns such as these -- and protecting the fact

that the United States had broken both the German and Japanese codes -- fueled the censors' vigilance and ruthless editing.

To imply that all journalists voluntarily obeyed the restrictions is naive; however, the difficulty of getting information out of the theater precluded significant inadvertent releases. (A notable exception was Rommel's use of information the British Broadcasting Corporation aired about the Allied intent in North Africa during the Crusader operations.)<sup>32</sup>

The world wars introduced greater structure to the military's control of the media. Each service had its own crew of reporters in uniform, and during the World War II the Army created Field Press Censorship Organizations to accommodate hundreds of reporters in theater and the volume and speed modern communications required. But even with the increased number of soldiers performing public affairs duties, technology whittled away at control. Multiple means of communications to the United States offered correspondents ways around the censorship system, but most reporters obeyed the ground rules out of patriotic duty. This overriding sense of love of country would not permeate the media in the coming wars.

Despite all the media grumbling and military censorship, the attitude of the military toward the media was generally friendly and the media felt "incorporated" into the military. (See Table 2-1, below.<sup>33</sup>) In his special report of military-media relations, Charles C. Moskos of Northwestern University documents the relationship trends first during the wars where journalists were typically "part of the units" they covered, then subsequent military actions. Having reporters in units -- most notably, Ernie Pyle --



continued through Korea, but changed drastically thereafter. This “embedded,” less hostile relationship between reporters and units has only been recently resurrected during the deployment to Bosnia.<sup>34</sup> This table depicts the key variables in military-media relations prior to the Vietnam War. Note that the press has virtually unrestricted access to units -- in fact reporters are assigned to units -- and that the attitude of the military toward the press is generally favorable. This attitude would change drastically during Vietnam.

Table 2-1. Trends in Military-Media Relations

Military-Media Variable	Pre-Vietnam*
When Story Begins	Shooting starts
Attitude of Military Toward Press	Friendly
Military Control of Media	High
Media Access to Military	Part of Unit
Focus on Civilian Entities, e.g. NGOs, Inter-agencies, Contract Civilians	Low
Media Perception of Military Relationship	Incorporated
When Story Ends	Shooting Stops

\* e.g. World War II, Korean War

### **Korea and Vietnam: Unpopular, Indecisive Wars: Strict Censorship Then Control**

*“Men will not fight and men will not die unless they know what they are fighting for ... In democracies it is essential that the public know the truth.”* Gen. Douglas MacArthur, 1942<sup>35</sup>

If one recurring theme seems apparent as one studies the history of military-media relations in the United States since the American Revolution, it is that after each conflict, any and all arrangements worked out with the press disappear. Therefore, at the outset of each conflict, new rules and procedures must be formulated by the current government and media representatives.

The Korean War is an especially notable case, in which the media arguably responded more quickly than the military to the commencement of hostilities. The first media cable about North Korea's invasion reached Washington 20 minutes ahead of the Ambassador John Muccio's.<sup>36</sup> Even as troops deployed to Korea and began fighting to maintain the "Pusan Perimeter," media ground rules were virtually non-existent. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. and United Nations forces avoided formal, involuntary censorship, opting instead for a vague, voluntary system.<sup>37</sup> Tensions created between the leaders of the retreating UN forces and journalists abated somewhat with the successful landing at Inchon, only to return in December, 1950 as the battle again turned ugly for the Americans. (It is worthy of note that cooperation between the military and the media is often directly proportional to the success on the field of battle.) As criticism of both the U.S. and South Korean forces mounted, as well as stories implicating corruption in the South Korean government, UN Command (UNC) instituted involuntary censorship December 20, 1950.<sup>38</sup> MacArthur rejected his statement that the "public know the truth" and forbade "any derogatory comments" about "allied conduct of the war."<sup>39</sup>

The rules the UNC applied virtually mirrored those issued during World War II. The primary difference between reporting in Korea and World War II was that

transmission means (including mail) out of Korea were rarely restricted. While some of these options existed during the world wars, the unique Korean situation shortened the time cycle. Reporters could fly to Japan and file their stories uncensored. Thus, for the first time, military censorship became readily avoidable for those journalists who risked doing so. Significantly, it was not until December 1952, nearly two years into the Korean War stalemate about the 38th Parallel, that control of censorship duty passed from the intelligence section to public affairs personnel.<sup>40</sup>

The war in Korea did not share the popular support in America that the world wars did. Foreshadowing the coming war in Vietnam, reporters documented the difficulties our forces experienced, much to the dismay of politicians and military leaders. The relationship between the military and the media had grown uncomfortably tense.

Vietnam is often viewed as the turning point in military-media relations, but clearly, the tension had existed since the Civil War. The deterioration of the working relationship, spurred by a perception of the media's affects on American popular support, drove a wedge between the two camps that has not yet been removed. In an unprecedented move, the United States waged the war "without the filtering that Army field press censorship had provided"<sup>41</sup> during the world wars. Reporters' freedom to move about and report the battles, and politics surrounding them, complicated the intent of the senior officials and leaders to down play U.S. involvement in the early stages of the conflict, and to avoid disparaging comments altogether.

The start of the rift began at Ap Bac in January, 1963, "a trivial place beyond governmental lines in the no-man's land,"<sup>42</sup> according to one reporter on the scene.

Although there had been some general grumbling about the treatment the media received from both the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments up to this point, Ap Bac represents the first serious divergence of reporters' perceptions and the governmental party line. Reporters saw the South Vietnamese loss at Ap Bac as "the costliest defeat up to that time for the American effort in South Vietnam."<sup>43</sup> When the official report reflected U.S. and South Vietnamese victory -- despite accusations of South Vietnamese cowardice by the senior American advisor in Ap Bac<sup>44</sup> -- incredulous reporters witnessed the beginning of attacks on their credibility. In their text, *The Press and America*, Edwin and Michael Emery contend that this "credibility gap" widened as the war trudged on, and polarized America: "In Vietnam, the central problem was not only that the military deliberately falsified information, but also that it more often withheld information detrimental to continued belief in the eventual success of U.S. policies ..."<sup>45</sup>

Thus the media and military were at odds with each other, often with completely different agendas. State Department and White House officials lambasted Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, about the type and volume of information leaving his command -- erroneously convinced his staff leaked information to the press. Those officials had merely underestimated the tenacity of the press: "... we believe that if U.S. sources sternly refused details, few reporters would seek out accurate facts by themselves."<sup>46</sup> Reporters had long been piecing together operational information without any assistance from Westmoreland's staff. According to William Hammond, the author of the Army's official history of the media in Vietnam, *Public Affairs, The Military and the Media 1962-1968*, journalists passed little if any useful operational information to

the enemy. In fact, Hammond said, "We could not confirm even one breach, never one where the enemy was able to take advantage, where they didn't have other ways of knowing."<sup>47</sup> Despite this candid admission some 15 years after the war, military leaders who grew up professionally during Vietnam have long-harbored ill feelings toward the media, some blaming the media for losing the war and losing popular support back home as well. The military grew hostile toward the press and the media felt more and more manipulated by canned briefings and limited access. Referring again to Moskos' table of "Trends," one quickly sees the shift in the military-media relationship as a result of Vietnam. (Table 2-2)<sup>48</sup> Note also how the story now begins sooner -- reporters want to be in the initial assaults into the theater. This and the other variables combine to clearly highlight how tensions increased as a result of the Vietnam War.

Table 2-2. Trends in Military-Media Relations

Military-Media Variable	Post-Vietnam**	Pre-Vietnam*
When Story Begins	Troops Arrive	Shooting starts
Attitude of Military Toward Press	Hostile	Friendly
Military Control of Media	Medium	High
Media Access to Military	Pools	Part of Unit
Focus on Civilian Entities, e.g. NGOs, Inter-agencies, Contract Civilians	Medium	Low
Media Perception of Military Relationship	Manipulated	Incorporated
When Story Ends	Troop Go Home	Shooting Stops

\* e.g. World War II, Korean War

\*\* e.g. Grenada, Panama, Gulf War

The relationship between the military and the media worsened throughout the war as the former became more tight-lipped and the latter, more frustrated with the former. While the White House and Pentagon were critical of the media's "unfair" representation of events in Vietnam, subsequent studies generally agree that the media's reports were far more accurate than the official word. And, the 2,000 or so media representatives that passed through Vietnam over the course of the war abided by the voluntary guidelines instituted to protect the troops.<sup>49</sup> There is no evidence that the media caused the U.S. policy to fail in Vietnam.

Some authors, like author Daniel C. Hallin, in his book, *The "Uncensored War,"* contend that the real reason America lost in Vietnam was poor policy from the White House, not reporters or the military.<sup>50</sup>

Whatever the cause of the breach between the military and the media, its affects linger. Vietnam era relations with the media provided the mutual distrust that defines particularly high level military-media dealings today. The next section of this monograph, "Vietnam's Impacts Today," discusses events from Vietnam to Desert Storm that forecast the current structure of Army Public Affairs as well as current policy with regards to the media.

### **Summary:**

As chronicled in this chapter, the media has accompanied our military in battle since the Revolution. As technology shortened the gap between battles and publication, the tension between the two institutions grew. By the Civil War, American leaders (both

Union and Confederate) applied strict censorship within their scope of authority. This press censorship extended into accreditation, or the requirement of each reporter to be formally accepted by a command, and ground rules -- a list of acceptable behavior and topics. General concepts of media control persisted through the world wars. As the numbers and types of media correspondents increased, so did the efforts of the military to limit potentially damaging or negative reports. The shift from censorship for soldiers' security to censorship to protect the reputations of senior leaders ultimately led to sharp disagreements and the resulting tension between reporters and service members. In Vietnam, a new information apparatus included not only the press liaisons, but the psychological operations, too.<sup>51</sup> And while the military did not generally censor information presented by the international media, its own outlets, namely *Stars and Stripes* and The Armed Forces Network, were severely limited in what they could publish or air.

The bad taste the media in Vietnam left in the mouths of young, up and coming leaders in the Army served more to color the future of Army Public Affairs than any factual issue. In *The "Uncensored War,"* Hallin comments that existing evidence (both from Vietnam and Afghanistan), "ought to put to rest the conservative thesis that the absence of control over the media doomed the American effort in Vietnam. Of course it won't: Political myths are never destroyed by evidence as long as they serve important functions."<sup>52</sup> The "important functions" Hallin describes are the future relations between the military and the media.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, rev. ed., (London, England: Penguin Books, 1972).

<sup>2</sup> Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, *The Press and America*, 4th ed.. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1978), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Buel, Jr., "Freedom of the Press in Revolutionary America: The Evolution of Libertarianism," in *The Press and the American Revolution*, ed. Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench, (Worcester, Mass.: The American Antiquarian Society, 1980), 81-82. The issue of press censorship during the Revolution is discussed in Paul L. Aswell, "Wartime Press Censorship by the U.S. Armed Forces, a Historical Perspective," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), 9-10.

<sup>6</sup> Emery and Emery, 173.

<sup>7</sup> Emery and Emery, 142.

<sup>8</sup> Aswell, 12.

<sup>9</sup> Emery and Emery, 176.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Aswell, 28.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>17</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," (*Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, October 1920; reprint Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990), 11.

<sup>18</sup> Ernest King, Admiral, U.S. Navy, quoted in James G. Diehl, "Lights! Camera! Action! The Operational Commander and the Media" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 13.

<sup>19</sup> Emery and Emery, 329.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 330.

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed discussion of the World War I guidelines, see Appendix E, "U.S. Wartime Press Censorship Documents from World War I," below.

<sup>22</sup> Aswell, 53.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 55.



<sup>24</sup> M.L. Stein, quoted in Aswell, 56. Aswell contends that American journalists reported consistently about American fighting spirit, numerical inferiority, "never-say-die" attitudes and compassion toward the French populace. These pervading themes were a sort of self-censorship that resulted in an unwritten credo for reporters with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 70.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 62. The new restrictions included: Accuracy, supplying no militarily significant information to the enemy, not injuring the morale of forces (home, abroad and allied), and not embarrassing to the U.S. or Allies. Techniques to bypass censors included a host of choices including the less-strictly checked French postal system and returning to the U.S. to file stories.

<sup>26</sup> Emery and Emery, 336 and Aswell, 72.

<sup>27</sup> Aswell, 75. While the specific WWII guidelines are not expressly covered in this monograph, one should note that the 1942 guide to the media is roughly six times longer than the 1917 guide (see appendix). Although some of this increase can be attributed to technological changes (from the airplane to radio to motion picture film), much more comes from expanding the basic categories of troop movements and ship sailings to include rumors, weather, production capabilities, etc. Clearly, the government (and its military) were becoming leery of the media and its ability to provide timely information to the public, including the enemy.

<sup>28</sup> Emery and Emery, 339.

<sup>29</sup> The list of categories of media representatives will ultimately include U.S. and international film and video crews for news, movies and documentaries, all types of writers from wire service reporters to epic authors, as well as local and syndicated radio, television and newspaper representatives. The formation of the Department of Defense News Media Pool represents a compromise in accommodating the representatives of different media.

<sup>30</sup> Aswell, 92.

<sup>31</sup> Harold B. Say, Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, "Censorship and Security," *Proceedings*, (79, No. 2 February 1953): 140 quoted in Aswell, 91.

<sup>32</sup> Robert Crisp, *Brazen Chariots*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), 40. Crisp refers to the indications that it was a BBC broadcast on the third night of the battle, not any intelligence gathered by German forces, that convinced Rommel of the true intent of "Crusader." Also see Corelli Barnett, *The Desert Generals*, 100. Barnett recounts a different instance (29 and 30 June 1942) in which Rommel believed (either intentionally or unintentionally false) reports of Allied troop dispositions that encouraged him to postpone his attack against Auchinleck and the "Alamein Line" by 24 hours, 195. Unintended, or "shadow," audiences continue to be a planning concern for public affairs personnel.

<sup>33</sup> Charles C. Moskos with Thomas Ricks, "Reporting War When There Is No War," (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996), 10.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>35</sup> Aswell, 89.

<sup>36</sup> Emery and Emery, 342.

<sup>37</sup> Aswell, 99.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>40</sup> Emery and Emery, 345.

<sup>41</sup> For a detailed explanation of the ground rules in Vietnam, see Appendix F. "Excerpts from 'Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information' (Vietnam) (31 October 1966 and 29 March 1967)," below.

<sup>42</sup> Peter Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994; Touchstone Books, 1995), 96. Arnett subsequently won the Pulitzer Prize for his war reporting in 1966.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Diehl, 20.

<sup>45</sup> Emery and Emery, 349.

<sup>46</sup> William M. Hammond, *The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, (Washington: Center of Military History, 1990) 140.

<sup>47</sup> William M. Hammond, quoted in Daniel C. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War"* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), xii. Hammond wrote the two-part series, *The Military and the Media, The U.S. Army in Vietnam*, (Washington, Center of Military History, 1990 and 1996).

<sup>48</sup> Moskos and Ricks, 10.

<sup>49</sup> Diehl, 24. Rarely did the number exceed 500 at any time, and fewer still were actually in the field with the troop units. For his figures, Diehl cites, Defense Information School, *Vietnam, 10 Years Later; What Have We Learned?*, (Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ind., 1983), 52.

<sup>50</sup> Hallin, xi.

<sup>51</sup> Hammond, 80. "In addition to continuing as director of psychological warfare, [Barry] Zorthian was to be the U.S. mission's overall counselor on relations with the news media. Subject to only the ambassador, he was to set policy; maintain liaison between the embassy, the Military Assistance Command, and the press; publicize information to refute erroneous and misleading press reports; and help newsmen cover the *positive side* of the war (emphasis added)." How the Johnson Administration expected Zorthian to accomplish these missions and promote "maximum candor and disclosure consistent with the requirements of security," Hammond, 82, is not known.

<sup>52</sup> Hallin, ix.

## Chapter 3

### Vietnam's Impacts Today

*"I do believe that the problems we in the Army have experienced [with the media] are based on our failure to make public affairs in wartime the commander's business. Essentially we have turned our dealings with the media over to the public affairs officers (PAO) and told the PAO to keep the media 'out of our hair.'"*<sup>1</sup>

The legacy of the Vietnam War on military-media relations is open hostility, distrust and dislike. The pervading notion among senior military leaders -- who, one must remember, were the junior leaders during the Vietnam years -- is that the media would sell its collective soul to beat a competitor with a breaking news story. That history does not pan this out is of minimal importance. What matters is the perception that the media cannot be trusted.

Despite the mistrust and general disappointment with the media's version of the Vietnam story, one must remember that censorship, per se, did not occur during that conflict. Official briefings, rife with underestimations, exaggerations, blatant omissions and out and out lies circumvented the need for formal censorship by the military.<sup>2</sup> In fact, "The media had extraordinary freedom to report the war in Vietnam without direct government control: it was the first war in which reporters were routinely accredited to accompany military forces yet not subject to censorship."<sup>3</sup> In fact, in 1976, the army eliminated the units detailed to perform field press censorship.<sup>4</sup>

The Joint [Vietnamese] U.S. Public Affairs Office remained as the official link between the military and the media representatives, growing at one time to 247 American and 370 Vietnamese personnel.<sup>5</sup> The Army considered the censorship issue, but studies in

both 1965 and 1966 recommended against field press censorship in theater, primarily for technical and legal reasons.<sup>6</sup> Technological advances -- television, telephones and commercial intercontinental aircraft -- ultimately proved to be too difficult to censor. Herein lies the crux of the problem: How can the military have an impact on the media while fighting and winning the nation's wars? Our first attempts relied on accreditation, pooling and ground rules.

### **Grenada: Prohibition and Pooling**

*"The strength of a free press lies not in that it is always and in every instance right. Its strength lies in that many different texts, voices and pictures, often contradicting each other, will give the reader, listener and viewer a possibility to form his own opinion."* Robert U. Brown, in *Editor and Publisher Magazine*<sup>7</sup>

A compilation of all the battlefield reporting of Operation Urgent Fury would amount to nothing, since reporters were expressly prohibited from the battle area until three days after the seizure of the island began. By then, most combat actions had ceased and the story was lost. When the military and administration finally granted the journalists access to the island, it was in a pool that limited both the numbers of media representatives and the access granted them. (The first pool to arrive -- fewer than 24 journalists from the group of hundreds waiting out the war in nearby Barbados -- received a three-hour "media opportunity" at a secured portion of the island. While reporters received a personal briefing from Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, the joint task force commander, they were not allowed to witness any of the operations still ongoing elsewhere on the island.)<sup>8</sup>

The military and the White House found numerous reasons for their purposeful exclusion of the media -- the danger, lack of time for preparation, lack of transportation

and need for complete secrecy, among others -- but none were sufficient to exclude reporters during such high risk operations as the Normandy D-Day landings or Inchon. This represented a clear departure from history. And, in polls, the precedent of a total blackout of the combat zone was unacceptable to a large number of America. In fact, while 52 percent favored keeping the journalists off Grenada, most expressed concerns about blackouts during future conflicts.<sup>9</sup>

In the ensuing month, some 400 reporters swarmed the tiny island for nuggets of news. Until the fifth day of the operation, the pooled media representatives received strictly guided tours, led by members of the Joint Information Bureau (JIB), a sort of scaled down version of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office used in Vietnam. After that, Admiral Metcalf allowed the media free access to the entire island. But by then, the story was not of U.S. troops in action, but how the media was restricted from reporting. As could be expected, the news media responded harshly and critically. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, in his book, *Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the US Invasion and the Caribbean History That Provoked It*, labeled the lack of media presence as the government's opportunity to "manage the news to its own best advantage."<sup>10</sup> Whatever control advantage the military had gained over the media those first few days were lost quickly as the media uproar continued. While U.S. troops may have fought on Grenada, ultimately the story was the news blackout and the complete exclusion of the media from the operation. For the news media, this was seen as a direct violation of the First Amendment.

## The Sidle Commission: Damage Control Leads to Formal Rules

*"The military must undertake training in this area [the role of the free press in an open society] if it is to accomplish its mission in the years ahead. Public information has become such a vital element in national military strategy that it is important for the commander to recognize and learn the customs and habits of the press and the media as a whole."* Barry Zorthian, former Director, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Saigon<sup>11</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly attempted to abate the furor Urgent Fury created by convening a board of what was to be senior military leaders and prominent members of the media. Newsmen balked. The panel was forced to accept retired newsmen and academicians to join them at the table. (Although working journalists declined to participate in the panel proceedings, many at least made presentations.)<sup>12</sup> Chaired by retired Major General Winant Sidle, the panel studied the often opposing issues of free speech and operational security.<sup>13</sup> The commission's charter centered about this focal question posed by General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of a military operation while keeping the American public informed through the news media?"<sup>14</sup>

The panel quickly assessed that the failure to include the media in the operation did not only affect the reporting of news, but that of history as well. With fewer objective eyes on the operation, much of the information reported was skewed by and toward its military authors.<sup>15,16</sup> The panel agreed to attempt to provide the media access to military operations and, ultimately, to several other major recommendations.<sup>17</sup>

The complete report is included as Appendix A, "CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel) Recommendations." Key components of the report include a strong

endorsement of a news media pool system underscored with minimum essential ground rules for operational security. Additionally, the report recommended improving public affairs planning and military logistics support to the media, as well as regular, professional, military-media contact. The bottom line, indicated in the Defense Department news release was:

The optimum solution to ensure proper media coverage of military operations will be to have the military -- represented by competent, professional public affairs personnel and commanders who understand media problems -- working with the media -- represented by competent, professional reporters and editors who understand military problems -- in a nonantagonistic atmosphere.<sup>18</sup>

However, the panel failed to delineate specifically military commanders' responsibilities to support the media, and furthermore, funded no resources. These shortcomings, coupled with an overly optimistic belief in pools, would keep matters from getting any better between the military and the media during the next operation. In hindsight, the media's boycott of the proceedings because of their exclusion from the operations in Grenada, and the military's general attitude of "we got away with it," doomed the successful application of Sidle's recommendations. A little less than six years later, acceptance and application of these recommendations were tested in Panama during Operation Just Cause. Military-media operations during this second major military action since Vietnam failed again.

### **Panama: Back to the Drawing Board**

*"Combat is not time for on-the-job training."* Fred Francis, NBC Pentagon Correspondent<sup>19</sup>

*"Once you've got all the forces moving and everything's being taken care of by commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don't handle the story right."* Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS<sup>20</sup>

Armed with the Sidle panel's concessions in hand, the media and military arrived in Panama, December 20, 1989 for Operation Just Cause. The complex operations plan included multiple, nearly-simultaneous airborne and ground assaults commencing just after midnight. Using all branches of service, both forward-deployed in Panama and from around the United States, the U.S. military descended upon Panama quickly, stealthily, and without media accompaniment.

The media pool, organized under the recommendations of the Sidle Panel, arrived in Panama several hours after the main battles concluded. Reporters were kept away from the fighting at the Comandancia. While the military contended the reporters were unprepared, the reporters countered that they had been herded together, too late to witness first combat, and stranded on Howard Air Base without access to any substantial military operations.<sup>21</sup>

Despite which side of the argument you join, there were serious failures in the military's ability to conduct media operations during combat. First, the transportation arrangements, even for the small media pool, were inadequate to get reporters to initial battles -- even *had* leaders planned for such a circumstance. When the bulk of reporters arrived in the ensuing days (some sources indicate upward of 800), the military public affairs apparatus could not come close to providing the logistic support -- transportation, communications, etc. -- required by the number of reporters. Orchestrated by the Joint Information Bureau, or JIB, media support (and the number of people to support the media) was woefully inadequate.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, numerous reporters in Panama, already covering the escalating tensions, were in position to cover the operations without



activating the media pool. These issues appeared to have been adequately addressed in the Sidle Panel recommendations. That the media representatives were often unknowledgable of military operations -- "the American tradition of combat reporting [had] withered"<sup>23</sup> -- could not be blamed for the military's failure to adequately plan, train and equip for media operations. Perhaps the gravest underestimation of the public affairs planners and commanders during Operation Just Cause, was the technological change that had taken place since Grenada. According to Peter Arnett, "CNN now had the technology, the skills and the money to go live anywhere in the world."<sup>24</sup>

As the operations in Panama faded into history, the media again shifted their focus to the ineffective use of the media pool and limited access. And once again, a joint, military-media committee met to address these shortcomings. Fred Hoffman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, chaired the committee. The resulting report highlighted the need for better, concurrent planning and higher levels of support for the media pool. (The report is included as Appendix B, "Review of the Panama Pool Deployment (Hoffman Report) Recommendations.")<sup>25</sup>

Unlike Sidle, the Hoffman Report recommended specific steps to deploy the media pool. In clear language, the committee recommended the Secretary of Defense strongly and publicly declare his support of the media pool and demand the support of the Defense Department and the military. According to the report, support to the media could include helicopters and communications assets "earmarked specifically for pool use."<sup>26</sup>

It was only months after the Hoffman Report hit the streets that the U.S. -- and the world's -- military and media set off again for combat operations. Operation Desert

Shield would successfully validate the Hoffman recommendations, but Operation Desert Storm, denoting the commencement of combat operations in the Persian Gulf, revealed remaining weaknesses in the pool and Joint Information Bureau systems.

### **Operations Desert Shield and Storm: The "Media War"**

*"I think it's rather sad there was no opportunity for millions of us to see anything of the bravery or dedication of the US soldiers on the battlefield."* Peter Jennings, as quoted in *How CNN Fought the War*<sup>27</sup>

*"We saw an Army public affairs system fashioned as a dead-end career for officers and staffed with a sprinkling of incompetents put there by media-wary generals, some of whom still blame the media for losing the Vietnam War."* John J. Fialka, author of *Hotel Warriors*<sup>28</sup>

*"You've got incompetence from the bottom up and you've got resistance from the top down and it met where we [reporters] were, in the pool. It all came together and it was disastrous."* Martha Teichner, a CBS correspondent<sup>29</sup>

Books abound on how military-media relations fared during operations in the Persian Gulf. Some, like those above, are -- at least in part -- highly critical. Other sources, including most polls of the American public, were much more favorable.<sup>30</sup> But for the reporters on the ground, it was a nightmare. The choice was simple: a steady diet of official news briefings in Riyadh or Dhahran, or the opportunity to spend time with a troop unit. Unfortunately, the latter afforded no guarantee that any stories would ever make it back to a telephone, fax machine or airplane, and hours of combat video footage never aired because it took weeks to get back to the JIB. In many cases, it literally took longer for copy to reach news bureaus during Desert Storm than during the Civil War.<sup>31</sup>

Part, in fact most, of the delay was a factor of the military providing inadequate resources to support the media. One of the reasons the military resources proved inadequate, was sheer numbers. The JUSPAO in Vietnam employed more than 200 U.S.

service members to support media operations in Saigon. While there were as many as 450-500 accredited media representatives in country, there were rarely more than about 27-40 journalists out in the field at any time. The ratio of correspondents to well-trained public affairs personnel was manageable. In Saudi Arabia, more than 1,600 reporters clamored for their piece of the four-day ground war.<sup>32</sup> Roughly a small brigade of correspondents sought to not only join the front line units, but to employ courier service to get their copy back to the JIB. The bulk of this burden fell on the Marine Corps and Army. The Marines were up to the challenge and lashed up with more than their fair share of reporters as ground operations began. The Army's handling of the media produced not only the comments and statistics above, but cost our nation's oldest service the opportunity to show America how well it could wage modern war.

A second problem was caused by the mobilization for Desert Storm. Many Army organizations were fleshed out with reserve component soldiers, who too often got stuck with media liaison duty. Without training, these augmentees were doomed to fail. Additionally, Vietnam-era officers with low opinions of the media led many of the larger units during Desert Storm. Their continued distrust of the media, and complete lack of adherence to the Sidle or Hoffman recommendations, compounded both the access and transportation problems.<sup>33</sup>

### **Summary:**

Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm served as roller coasters for military-media relations. Out of these rides came principles, rules and

guidelines determined to somehow manage to integrate soldiers and newsmen on the same active battlefield. The technology that allowed Peter Arnett (and crew) to broadcast live battle damage assessment from the hotel in Baghdad, could not solve the "censorship by access"<sup>34</sup> problem that reporters accompanying U.S. troops suffered in all these operations. The reporters' frustrations led to still more meetings and conferences between the military and the media -- in fact, they continue today.<sup>35</sup> The major news organizations summed up their feelings in an April 1991 letter to then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in April 1991:

Our sense is that virtually all major news organizations agree that the flow of information to the public was blocked, impeded or diminished by the policies and practices of the DOD. Pools did not work. Stories and pictures were late or lost. Access to the men and women in the field was interfered with by a needless system of military escorts and security review. These conditions meant that we could not tell the public the full story of those who fought the nation's battle.<sup>36</sup>

But if the military based its "corrective" actions solely on the public's reactions, not the media's concerns, little if anything needed change. For popular opinion following operations in the Gulf tracked with statistics taken after Grenada: the majority of Americans felt the military was justified in limiting the media in the name of security. But just as they had done with the Sidle Panel after Grenada, the Department of Defense sat down with the media in an attempt to improve working relations. The military did this for two primary reasons: a nagging feeling of moral obligation to provide the people, press and Congress of America "the story," and the realization that, as Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, the commander in Grenada said, "the media expended more column inches and time defending their prerogatives than in reporting the story."<sup>37</sup> It was the Sidle Panel that originally framed the media-military debate in terms not of how to provide newsmen

information, but how to provide them access. "It is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces."<sup>38</sup> In September, 1984, the Department of Defense notified 10 separate (and very surprised) media outlets that they would form the new DOD News Media Pool.

The pool practiced several times but did not get it right until Operation Desert Shield. Operation Just Cause had been a dismal failure for the pool system -- so much so, that the Defense Department chaired a military-media committee again. The recommendations were codified in joint doctrine by March, 1990, in JCS Pub 5-02.2, inasmuch as the book specified public affairs planning guidance in Annex F.<sup>39</sup> (The first delineated responsibility is for the commander-in-chief to "[provide] maximum information about the command to the American people, ...")<sup>40</sup>

But even the successful pool deployment to Saudi Arabia was quickly overshadowed by the complete swamping of U.S. assets by the nearly 2,000 media representatives that followed. The pool system was not successful during Desert Storm, when reporters in the field often watched their video and copy take days or weeks to get to the JIB. The truth is, according to Pascale Combelles-Siegel, author of "The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today," that "the military will never be able to match the press's ability to pick newsworthy events, go from one to the next, and leave an unworthy spot in time to go to a newsworthy one."<sup>41</sup> Combelles-Siegel calls the oft-misused pool arrangement, "a poor alternative to no coverage at all."<sup>42</sup> Her assertion is that while the pool arrangement satisfies the need for

the military to keep a tight rein on the media for security purposes, it fails to provide the journalist access to combat. "Indeed, obtaining access to real combat operations through pools has been a challenge. *This requires that journalists be attached to combat units prior to the beginning of operations* (emphasis added)."<sup>43</sup> Her point is significant, because it demonstrates the media's need for "embedding" reporters in units -- as was done for the deployment to Bosnia. Additionally, she raises valid concerns about the success of pools as a function of public affairs planning:

... the resort to an exclusive, all-pool system to cover combat operations has exacerbated planning and coordination problems. And when pooling activities did not go as planned or expected, it left little room for improvement. In spite of recommendations by both Sidle and Hoffman, public affairs planning has not been effective. The first problem lies in compartmented planning. 'Compartmentalization' means that only people who "need to know" are brought into the planning process. Public affairs officers are generally not part of those considered by senior leaders and key staff officers and planners to be essential for operational planning. They too often are perceived as not having a 'need to know.' ...

Second, the resort to the pool concept has created some antagonistic relations between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA) and commanders who are responsible for public affairs activities in their area of responsibility (AOR). Over the decade, OASD-PA has seemed to be receptive to the media's concerns over access. However, this office has rarely been able to impose its views on commanders.<sup>44</sup>

As Combelles-Siegel correctly points out, the problem at OASD-PA stems from the fact that it is a staff agency, and cannot issue orders to commanders -- only guidance. But she was not the only one who recognized a problem. Secretary Cheney also had concerns about military-media relations, and, beginning in September, 1991, met individually with key media representatives to discuss the issue. Within eight months, they had developed the "Statement of DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations."<sup>45</sup>

Heralded by both the military and the media as the wave of the future, these principles, coupled with collective experiences since the American Revolution, serve as the basis for Army public affairs operations today.<sup>46</sup>

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> A "military participant" of the April 23-24, 1992 Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation Cantigny Conference, quoted in, "Reporting the Next War," ed. Nancy Ethiel, (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation), 13. The McCormick Foundation has conducted several such conferences, and published reports entitled, "The Military and the Media: The Continuing Dialogue," (1993). "The Changing Nature of Conflict," (1995); and "Reporting War When There Is No War," (1996). "The conference series offers the opportunity for collaboration between the [McCormick] Foundation and other institutions or associations that are addressing issues consonant with the Foundation's mission." In part, that mission is "to encourage a free and responsible discussion of issues affecting the nation." Journalists and military officers (active and retired), as well as prominent business leaders and academicians attended the conferences cited.

<sup>2</sup> There is much to choose from to support these assertions. Specific questionable news releases include the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the first bombings in Laos, the reports of Ap Bac, just to name a few. That the daily news briefing in Saigon had been dubbed, "The Five O'clock Follies" by correspondents indicates the lack of factual rigor in the official statements. See Emery and Emery, and Hammond, for other examples.

<sup>3</sup> Hallin, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Patricia A. Grossman, "The Future of Field Press Censorship: Is There One?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989). 1. Congress had cut funding for the "Wartime Information Security Program," which provided the authority and procedures for Field Press Censorship (FPC) two years prior. The program would be rescinded in its entirety in 1987.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 12. Among the reasons were the difficulty of integrating the South Vietnamese who were no less than brutal with their own media, the lack of censorship in the U.S. (where there could be none unless war was declared), the impracticality of censoring stories filed in Saigon while knowing that a reporter could file the same story outside the theater with impunity, and the technical difficulties in censoring television film. The 1966 committee was chaired by MG Winant Sidle, who again chaired a commission with the media after operations on Grenada.

<sup>7</sup> Robert U. Brown, "Veteran Newsmen Can Live with Press Pools," *Editor and Publisher*, 18 May 1991, 22, quoted in Clinton D. Esaray, MAJ, USA, "The Media and the U.S. Army: You Don't Always Get What You Want; You May Just Get What You Need," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 15.

<sup>8</sup> Esaray, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Grossman, 16.

<sup>10</sup> Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the US Invasion and the Caribbean History That Provoked It*, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1984), 204.

<sup>11</sup> Barry Zorthian, quoted in Clyde A. Hennies, "Public Affairs Training for the Army's Officer Corps: Need or Neglect?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1983), 5-6.

<sup>12</sup> Winant Sidle, MG, USA, "The Military and the Press: Is the Breach Worth Mending?" *Army*, February 1985, 24.

<sup>13</sup> Sidle was, at the time, arguably the single most experienced military-media expert in the military community. He was formerly the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Chief of Information, and held the position of senior Army Public Affairs Officer (then called the "Chief of Information") and, until his retirement in 1975, was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Esaray, 45, n. 44.

<sup>14</sup> Esaray, 23.

<sup>15</sup> "Objective" only in the sense that news media representatives are not bound by the same chain of command as the service members about whom they report. One should never assume reporters are completely objective -- all come to the table with, as Peter M. Senge, author of *The Fifth Discipline*, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990; New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994) would say, "mental models." These "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action" affect all of us, reporters not excluded. To overcome this bias, Senge recommends first recognizing our own mental models then subjecting them to scrutiny, while conducting dialogue with others about the model to promote more open thinking, 8-9, 174-204. It would seem that Senge recommends the military develop a better relationship with the media, expose prejudices and attempt to recognize differences and work together. Also, see Esaray, 12-18, and O'Shaughnessy, 204-214.

<sup>16</sup> See Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury*, (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books: 1989). Adkin asserts the operation was uncoordinated, mismanaged and tactically disappointing, something U.S. military reports do not bear out.

<sup>17</sup> David K. Schiller, "Media as a Force Enhancer: The Operational Planning Considerations," (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994), 25-26.

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense News Release, "Report of the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel," (Washington DC, August 23, 1984).

<sup>19</sup> Fred Francis, quoted in Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 411.

<sup>20</sup> Colin Powell, Gen, USA, quoted in Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 155.

<sup>21</sup> Esaray, 18-20.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Public Affairs, Field Manual 46-1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986). Doctrinally, the correct Army term would be "News Media Center (NMC)." Complicating the "information clearinghouse's" functions, is the fact that this is an ad hoc organization. The JIB or NMC works for the unified command PAO, but has its own commander. This is essentially



the same system deployed to Saudi Arabia -- Army Public Affairs doctrine did not change between the operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

<sup>23</sup> Donnelly, 411. The passage continues, "with defense reporting having become just Pentagon reporting, another Washington beat." Without question, the media's unpreparedness contributed to military complaints about the media's unsuitability for combat coverage. However, previous deployments of the media pool had not faced such grand challenges -- like immediate combat action -- and neither the military nor the media had trained for this sort of "movement to contact." However, Just Cause was similar enough to Urgent Fury that it should have been better anticipated.

<sup>24</sup> Arnett, 96.

<sup>25</sup> Schiller, 27-29.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Peter Jennings, quoted in Perry M. Smith, *How CNN Fought the War*, (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1991), 181.

<sup>28</sup> John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors*, (Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991), 2.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>30</sup> Schiller, 8. Media coverage, as ranked by the American public, reached an 83 percent approval rating. Ninety percent of Americans agreed with some form of censorship as well.

<sup>31</sup> Schiller, 9. "Less than 70 percent of the field pool reports filed even arrived at the JIB in less than two days; some of them took several more days to make it to the states."

<sup>32</sup> Dr. Stephen Badsey, a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, England, provides an explanation for the Army's disproportionate burden for media scrutiny. He contends that media coverage of the Air Force is skewed because "the use of bomb- or missile-camera videotape released after the operation may allow the military to dictate the story to the media, virtually depriving them of their traditional 'gatekeeper' function in deciding which news is to be passed to the public, and how it is to be presented." He goes on to say that "Naval operations, in the context of military-media relations, may either be regarded as air operations launched from a ship, with the same opportunities and problems as their land based equivalents, or otherwise fall within very traditional naval activities such as patrolling and blockade, which seldom attract much media attention." Stephen Badsey, "Modern Military Operations and the Media," (Sandhurst, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 14.

<sup>33</sup> Fialka is particularly critical of a Lieutenant Max Blumenfeld of the Tennessee National Guard, serving with VII Corps and MG John Tilelli, then commander of the 1st Cavalry Division.

<sup>34</sup> Schiller, 9.

<sup>35</sup> See the earlier note on the McCormick Foundation. The McCormick Foundation is but one organization that is continuing the dialogue among the military, the media and the academic world.

<sup>36</sup> From a letter to the Secretary of Defense, April 29, 1991, quoted in Pascale Combelles-Siegel, "The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 3.

<sup>37</sup> Combelles-Siegel, 5.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Planning System, OPLAN Formats and Guidance*, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 5-02.2, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 March 1990), II-339 through II-374.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., II-339.

<sup>41</sup> Combelles-Siegel, 12.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 17-18.

<sup>45</sup> For the complete statement, see Appendix D, "Statement of DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations," below.

<sup>46</sup> "Speaking for the media group, Louis Boccardi, CEO of Associated Press, said: 'It is the consensus of our group that the guidelines offer the promise of the kind of coverage the citizens of a democracy are entitled to have.'" Combelles-Siegel, 21.

## Chapter 4

### Public Affairs in Today's Army: Challenges or Mission Impossible?

#### The Root of the Problem

*"Attitudes are the key to the difficult issues in the military-media relationship."*<sup>1</sup>

*"The media-Army relationship is composed of shared and antithetical needs and expectations. The most crucial need that is shared by both institutions is their interdependence in fulfilling some of the basic needs of the American democracy."*<sup>2</sup>

*"It seemed to me that the military public affairs operation went to war in the Persian Gulf not just against Saddam Hussein but also against the Saigon press corps of 1972."*<sup>3</sup>

The greatest impediments to improving media coverage of military operations -- which, after all, should be the goal of Army public affairs efforts -- are operational security, the military-media relationship and Army doctrine itself. To determine where the problem lies, a brief look at these issues is necessary.

In an attempt to satisfy the competing issues of operational security and the right of a free press to cover combat, Defense Secretary Cheney spent months meeting with the media to hammer out the compromise dubbed the "DOD Principles."<sup>4</sup> Cheney not only had to deal with an irate media after Desert Storm, but a downsizing and less than remorseful military. After all, the American public overwhelmingly approved of Desert Storm coverage. Ultimately, the compromises Cheney incorporated into the Principles resulted from a combination of the media's right to cover combat -- albeit restricted in some fashion to accommodate OPSEC considerations -- and the military's need to reach its public to generate support and funding during the post-Cold War reduction of forces.<sup>5</sup>

However, operational security, even through the Gulf War, had not been a significant problem. Few leaks of sensitive information have been attributed to journalists

reporting from the battlefield. Virtually none have afforded the enemy a tactical or strategic edge in combat. Journalists have demonstrated the ability to respect the need for OPSEC when granted access to future plans.<sup>6</sup>

The tension between the military and media that had festered since the Civil War, grew to epidemic proportions during Vietnam. Attempts to reduce the tension between Vietnam and the Gulf War failed, in part due to the attitudes of military leaders and the reporters themselves. Soldiers wanted manageable media representatives, and reporters demanded free access. These two objectives often conflicted. In 1983, DOD attempted to reconcile the differences. But by requiring pools and lengthy security reviews, the DOD effectively controlled which stories got aired or published. As late as 1991, reporters felt they had been "censored" by not being allowed access to operations.

Despite DOD Directives, the Army still felt no need to incorporate media planning into contingency operation plans. In fact, many officers contend that the journalistic trade is largely incapable of reporting combat operations.<sup>7</sup> The media's counter-argument is that reporters act more "independently" when less familiar with highly technical subjects.<sup>8</sup> This argument does not pass muster for military leaders faced with combat, and the negative attitude toward the press permeated the Gulf War-era Army commanders.<sup>9</sup>

Even so, attitudes could only contribute to the lack of support for the media. The Army is a religiously pragmatic and disciplined organization. Therefore, had a military leader demanded that the media be supported in accordance with the DOD guidelines, Army units would have complied.<sup>10</sup> The most significant obstacle in the Army's path to better media relations was not attitudes, but resources. The fixes endorsed by both the

Sidle and Hoffman Committees (primarily pools and security reviews) were logistically unrealistic. In the Army, a commander's support of a higher-level directive can often be measured in terms of how much he is willing to expend to be successful. This is not a new concept. In fact on a much broader scale, Clausewitz discusses it in *On War*.<sup>11</sup> While Clausewitz speaks of government expenditures to seize an object in war, the principle remains: If the boss (or nation) wants to achieve an object, sufficient resources must be made available. In her book, *Lights, Camera, War*, Johanna Neuman described the logistical support in frontier terms: "Reports first had to survive the battlefield communications systems, and then clear the military censors at headquarters. Reporters called the system 'Pony Express,' and often it failed to meet even that lethargic mail carrier's track record for delivery."<sup>12</sup>

Even if Army commanders had wanted to support the media representatives who were dropped off in their areas just prior to the commencement of the ground combat phase, they would have been hard-pressed to provide the communications and transportation media representatives required.<sup>13</sup>

The root of the problem, then, was not an anti-media sentiment, journalistic unpreparedness or an overriding need for operational security, but inadequate doctrine, organization and equipment. To better determine what the Army needs for tomorrow, a brief discussion of the foundations of the current Army doctrine is necessary.

#### **Army Public Affairs Doctrine: From the Beginning**<sup>14</sup>

*"Smart generals understand all too well that wars can be won on the world's television screens as well as on the battlefield."* Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*<sup>15</sup>

*We are engaged in a battle of words and pictures no less important than the battle of men and firepower, and it is one for which we are grossly unprepared.*  
Marine General Lewis Walt<sup>16</sup>

The most basic tools and doctrine in use today are more than 70 years old. In the 25 June 1928 edition of Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Chapter I, Staff Principles and Functions*, the G-2 was given the staff responsibility for media access and censorship. Specifically, the G-2 was to prepare "rules for the regulation of the activities of ... press correspondents .. who may be attached to the unit," as well as to prepare the "rules and controls" of the censorship program.<sup>17</sup> The 1940 FM 101-5 added the "public information" function, which not only limits what leaves the headquarters (as in the 1928 edition), but generates and provides information to the public about the Army. In this task the G-2 was to coordinate with the G-3 "for activities to be disclosed," another tier of censorship.<sup>18</sup> In 1950, the manual added a new staff position, "Chief of Information." This staff officer was to provide advice to the commander on all public information issues and public opinion, and was responsible to coordinate all public and internal information.<sup>19</sup> The FM anticipated that this position would be needed only at Army and higher levels, and the Chief of Information did not take over the press-related censorship duties the G-2 had previously handled.

Four years later, in the 1954 edition, the job had been renamed, "Public Information Officer" and gained the responsibilities of security review, public relations and earning public "support and understanding."<sup>20</sup> By 1970, the position was again renamed, this time to, "Information Officer." The Information Officer's duties included command information, media escort, public opinion monitoring, community relations, supervising the field press censors and conducting security reviews.<sup>21</sup> It is this 1970 manual that provides

the basis for current Army public affairs responsibilities. Significantly, unlike the manual of less than 20 years prior, the new FM required all units with staffs to have an Information Officer. There were no significant changes in the 1972 edition of FM 101-5.

The next, and current, version of the manual, dated May 1984, arrived coincidentally as the Secretary of Defense first agreed to pooling.<sup>22</sup> For the first time, FM 101-5 detailed the duties of the "Public Affairs Officer" (PAO). Among these duties are:

- Advising and informing the commander of the public affairs impact and applications inherent in planned or implemented operations
- Serving as the command spokesman
- Ensuring information for public dissemination is reviewed for compliance with security and policy requirements
- Conducting liaison with media representatives to provide accreditation, mess, billet, transport, and escort as authorized and appropriate, and
- Serving in an advisory capacity to the media and the field press censor for their mutual benefit if field press censorship is imposed.<sup>23</sup>

Considering that the Army had eliminated field press censorship units in 1976 -- after a war that had no official censorship per se -- the latter function reveals a blatant sign of Army PA doctrine lagging behind the doctrinal times.

Additionally, the manual made no mention of pools or pool support. DOD had established the national pool to meet three objectives:

1. To make sure that it was possible to activate a small group of journalists without endangering operational security. To achieve this objective, DOD has established a series of guidelines to enable secret activation of the pool. It has also imposed a system of security review applicable to all pool material, so that journalists would not improperly write about forbidden information.
2. To make sure that the pool was transported to an event.
3. To make sure that communication facilities were available to file pool products in a timely manner.<sup>24</sup>

The failure to include -- and endorse -- pool operations is a significant omission because pool operations require lengthy planning and considerable resources. The pool functions according to these principles:

- It is a noncompetitive pool. News organizations participating in the pool agree to share all information and products with the rest of the media industry.
- Reporters must obey escorts' orders. They cannot break away from the pool.
- They cannot directly communicate with their organizations and can only file via military equipment.
- They must follow ground rules and guidelines.
- They are subject to security review.
- They are expected to ask for media opportunities.<sup>25</sup>

The DOD National News Media Pool was created to afford journalists access to remote areas during the initial phases of combat where no reporters are present (e.g. Grenada or Saudi Arabia) or when operational security concerns warrant access restrictions (e.g. Normandy or Inchon). The pool was never intended to provide long-term coverage nor to be used as a media control device. This complex system of often competing interests -- the media and the military, embodied in reporters and soldiers -- juxtaposed in combat for what is likely the first time for each, needs to be recognized by doctrine and trained for accordingly. By avoiding or ignoring this fragile, volatile issue, the Army had placed the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in a box.

### **The State of (Public) Affairs: Corps and Division Assets**

*"I am not sure we thoroughly thought through the implication of fighting in the desert while also providing support to the media. ... When I returned from Southwest Asia, I was upset to find that people did not know that the 3d Armored Division and VII Corps had been in a very heavy fight under great contact with some of the enemy's first-rate units. The story was not told well enough ..."* Major General Paul Funk, Desert Storm Division Commander<sup>26</sup>



The task "to provide accreditation, mess, billet, transport and escort ..." overtaxed the PAO. The tiny division public affairs section -- consisting of an officer and three or four soldiers -- could not possibly provide all this support.<sup>27</sup> In order to conduct anything greater than the most basic public affairs planning and 24-hour support to the division, the divisional PA section had to be augmented. Outside help, in the form of escorts and drivers, comes largely from higher level PA units, such as Public Affairs Teams/Detachments (PAT/PAD), Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPAD), Press Camp Headquarters (PCH) and/or Broadcast Public Affairs Detachments (BPAD).<sup>28</sup> For many division commanders, having their PAO escort a media representative through the division area was marginally acceptable, but having an unfamiliar soldier (commonly a reservist) escorting the media was something else altogether.<sup>29</sup>

The Army published its first public affairs doctrinal manual, Field Manual 46-1, in April, 1986. In 1990, as a result of the Hoffman Report, Commanders-in-Chief received additional, stronger DOD guidelines about supporting the media in JCS Pub 5-02.2.<sup>30</sup> In November 1991, in the cornerstone joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, the Army received somewhat conflicting guidance. First, that "modern news reporting" can restrict freedom of action, then that the "informational effort is crucial to the success of any contemporary military operation, because it involves the support of the American people, allies, and friendly nations and the morale of the opposing side."<sup>31</sup> Ultimately, Joint Pub 1 indicates that the military must balance the needs of a free press and operational security.<sup>32</sup> The release of new DOD

guidance and Joint Pub 1 did not significantly impact Army PA doctrine, even in the July 1992 version of FM 46-1 nor the February 1995 version of Joint Pub 1.<sup>33</sup>

Until the current "final draft" of FM 46-1 (November 1996), formal Army PA doctrine had not incorporated the DOD Principles into PA operations. The new draft includes not only the Principles, but a much-needed reorganization of PA Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units (Appendix H).<sup>34</sup> Clearly, PA doctrine has lagged behind both the enabling technology and the public's desire to see near real time broadcasts from combat zones. Similarly, despite advances in the media's tools to report hostilities, and ever-increasing numbers of reporters on the battlefield, Army PA force structure has not markedly changed since the 1980s. This force structure, personnel and equipment, is wholly inadequate to conduct the numerous missions outlined in FM 46-1.

### **Summary**

The doctrine and personnel situation for public affairs professionals in the divisions and corps cannot support the demands of information age warfare. While the latest draft of FM 46-1 provides a lengthy discussion on the global and military information environments (GIE/MIE) to explain the difficulties of information management on the modern battlefield, the Army maintains little tactical equipment to support media operations at war.<sup>35</sup>

The need today for public affairs doctrine is clear. Technology has enabled news media representatives to file stories, including video, from portable satellite communications devices. No longer must reporters rely solely on the Army to transmit

copy via military communications links. The compromises Secretary Cheney obtained in the Principles provided broad guidance for the Army, but few real solutions to the problem of supporting the media. "Attitudes and expectations," are not common bases of issue for military equipment. Needs in excess of military necessity are equally rare. Leaders understand the Army's need to fight and win the next battle. They are less familiar with what the Army needs to reach the public, both with internal mechanisms and through the media. To better prepare Army leaders for media operations on the battlefield, the Army must improve its doctrine, training and equipment.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> "Reporting the Next War," 50.

<sup>2</sup> Esaray, 25-26.

<sup>3</sup> An unnamed journalist quoted in Richard H. Sinnreich, "The Changing Face of Battlefield Reporting," *Army*, November 1994, 34.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix D, "Statement of DOD Principles for New Media Coverage of DOD Operations".

<sup>5</sup> The word "public" can be used in its plural form, "publics," to denote differences between sectors of the populace. For example, the Army's "command information" program has as its public, *its intended audience*, soldiers, civilian employees and family members. (The final draft of FM 46-1, dated November 1996, renames the Army's command information program, "internal" information, p. 71.) Some Army messages must reach Congress, the rest of America, and/or the world's decision makers. These target audiences are sometimes referred to as separate *publics*. For the purpose of this monograph, "public" will refer to all potential audiences (intended and unintended) unless a specific segment or particular audience is noted. According to the July 1992 version of FM 46-1, "... no wars can be won without the understanding and support of the American people." (p. 1-1). The idea of having a staff objective to earn popular support first appeared Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1954).

<sup>6</sup> The landing on D-Day is a good example where journalists were briefed on the mission before leaving England, yet held their reports until the information had no tactical value. More recently, briefings preceding the missions to Somalia and Haiti included media representatives. For an opposing viewpoint, see William V. Kennedy, *The Military and the Media, Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, CT, 1993) Kennedy's theses are that reporters are neither prepared (competent) nor honest enough to be trusted with war reporting.

<sup>7</sup> "Reporting the Next War," 14. "The military is convinced that journalists who cover the services need more specialized training than they now receive." Also, "some [senior commanders] believe it is

necessary to keep the media at a distance." (Ibid., 12) Journalistic ignorance has other consequences: "... journalists are going to continue to be vulnerable to manipulation by official sources if they are not armed with more knowledge about the issues they are covering." (Ibid., 52).

<sup>8</sup> See Dan Rather, "Honest Brokers of Information," *Naval War College Review*, Newport, R.I., Autumn 1995, 34-42. "The prevailing view among the press seems to be. ... 'A journalist's skill is what you can find out, not what you know.'" "Reporting the Next War," 16.

<sup>9</sup> See Fialka, Johanna Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). *The Media and the Gulf War*, ed. Hedrick Smith, (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press, 1992), for support of this assertion.

<sup>10</sup> The principle DOD Directive is 5105.35, "Responsibility of Unified and Specified Commands in Public Affairs Matters."

<sup>11</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 585-586.

<sup>12</sup> Neuman, 209. Neuman's reference to censors reveals one reporter's thoughts of security review procedures.

<sup>13</sup> See Fialka. Fialka describes innumerable cases of military (primarily Army) leaders' outright disapproval of the media -- some have been cited previously -- but while attitudes varied among his military contacts, none had the resources to accommodate his, or any of the hundreds of other media representatives, needs.

<sup>14</sup> Up until now, this monograph has dealt with the military as a whole, while highlighting specific Army events. From here forward, the focus will be all Army, primarily at the division level. It will be necessary to talk about some non-divisional and echelons above corps units, merely because discussing the personnel structure of PA will require it. It is imperative to note that the Army and the Marine Corps' land forces, are most affected by media attempts to accompany units into close combat. See Badsey, 14, and note in Chapter 3 of this monograph.

<sup>15</sup> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, (New York: Warner Books, 1993), 173.

<sup>16</sup> Lewis Walt, Gen., USMC, quoted in Sinnreich, 33.

<sup>17</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Chapter I, Staff Principles and Functions*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 June 1928), 12.

<sup>18</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 August 1940), 12.

<sup>19</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 July 1950), 21-22.

<sup>20</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1954), 33.

<sup>21</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1968 (with change 1, 13 January 1970), 1-18.

<sup>22</sup> One could argue that pooling pre-dates 1984. Pools were used at Normandy and Inchon, for example. But 1984 provides the directive that forms the national media pool for contingencies. It is the birth of a "modern" media pool.

<sup>23</sup> Department of the Army, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Operations*, Field Manual 101-5, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May, 1984), 3-30.

<sup>24</sup> Combelles-Siegel, 14-15. The DOD has specific rules concerning use of the pool. According to Combelles-Siegel, pool reporters are granted special privileges that independent reporters, or "unilaterals," do not enjoy. For example, non-pool reporters already in Panama covering the increasing tensions there prior to Operation Just Cause, received no support from the U.S. forces during the initial phases of the operation.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 7-8. These functions come from the "DOD National Pool Ground Rules," in the *DOD National Media Pool Deployers' Information Package*, a DOD handout to reporters dated October 1993.

<sup>26</sup> Major General Paul E. Funk, "Accommodating the Wartime Media: A Commander's Task," *Military Review*, April 1993, 78-80.

<sup>27</sup> MTOE for mech./armored division, April 1993. The corps has a similarly under strength PA section, headed by a lieutenant colonel, that requires augmentation during wartime and contingencies.

<sup>28</sup> Department of the Army, *Public Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 46-1. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1992), 2-21 through 2-29. Current manpower authorizations for these units are in Appendix H, "Force Structure."

<sup>29</sup> Currently, more than 65 percent of the total PA force and 85 percent of the deployable TOE unit structure is in the Reserve Component. Department of the Army, *Public Affairs Operations*, Final Draft, Field Manual 46-1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1996), 45.

<sup>30</sup> Joint Pub 5-02.2 was superseded by Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance*, Joint Publication 5-03.2, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1992).

<sup>31</sup> Department of Defense, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1991), 38.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>33</sup> The greatest changes between the 1986 and 1992 versions of FM 46-1 are the "checklist-type," step-by-step instructions, emphasis on deployability and PA in contingency operations. Joint Pub 1 reiterates the need for balance between OPSEC and free access (p. 22).

<sup>34</sup> FM 46-1, Final Draft, November 1996, 46-52.

<sup>35</sup> FM 46-1, Final Draft, November 1996, 7-13. A more thorough discussion of the GIE/MIE is in Chapter 5 of this monograph.

## Chapter 5

### The Future of Military-Media Relations

*"Despite a variety of frictions mainly caused by persistent mutual misunderstanding and ignorance, the relationship today between the U.S. military service and the media is generally healthy. American reporters enjoy extraordinarily good access to today's military operations, especially if they are sufficiently experienced to know how to seek out the appropriate level of action."* Professor Charles C. Moskos, Northwestern University<sup>1</sup>

*"Taken as a whole, military forces, for all the imposing array of electronic gadgetry at their disposal give no evidence whatsoever of being one whit more capable of dealing with the information needed for the command process than were their predecessors a century or even a millennium ago."* Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*<sup>2</sup>

If Army public affairs doctrine, force structure and training are flawed, is there hope for future military-media relations? More important, is there hope for improved media coverage of military operations? In times of decreased budgets and manpower, how can Army public affairs improve its service to commanders and members of the fourth estate and American public?

The key to solving the dilemmas facing the Army in operations in a modern media environment is first to admit that the media will accompany soldiers to battle. Military operations inside the global information environment (GIE) have already become commonplace. In fact, this has been true of American soldiers and journalists at least since the Civil War.<sup>3</sup> While this arrangement seems to be the historical norm, planning for the inclusion of the media in U.S. military operations is still tentative at best. Army officers need to be convinced, through formal schooling and practice during exercises, that the media will present them challenges in future conflicts. In his monograph, "The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward," Charles Ricks contends that "there is no longer a question of whether the news media will cover military operations."<sup>4</sup>

Field Manuals (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, 100-6, *Information Operations*, and 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*, echo this sentiment.

Based on the discussion of this monograph heretofore, the future holds other truths about public affairs and the media:

- Although PA doctrine (as revised in the latest drafts of FM 46-1, 100-5 and 100-6) has begun to anticipate military operations in the GIE, Army leaders and units have not yet embraced this doctrine. For PA to be successful, Army leadership must support and resource public affairs initiatives.
- Current Army public affairs forces -- both in grade and aggregate strength -- are incapable of handling all PA missions. Improvements are on the way, but only reflect the start of what is needed to correct years of neglect.
- The media will often precede military forces into an area of operations.
- Because the media will arrive in the area of operations before the Army, pools will not always be appropriate nor effective for the media or the military. Media pools must be the exception rather than the rule for correspondents in a military environment -- *as dictated by the DOD Media Guidelines*.
- Communications technology has made effective wartime censorship virtually impossible, unless media access to a military area of operations is denied. However, denying reporters access to friendly operations does not preclude media representatives accompanying an adversary's forces.
- "Army Public Affairs is a fundamental tool of competent leadership, a critical element of effective battlefield command, and an essential part of successful mission accomplishment."<sup>5</sup>

These basic premises form the media environment in which American soldiers will fight the next battle. The term, "media environment," is especially appropriate when discussing military-media relations. Similar to operations in a nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) environment, soldiers today have no choice in whether or not they must function on a battlefield with reporters. Unlike the NBC environment, for which soldiers train from their reception into the Army, but may never face in battle, all future U.S. Army operations will be conducted in a media environment. This is not to qualitatively associate the two environments -- the NBC environment presents a clear hazard to life while working with the media poses no such threat. However, considering the impact the media can have on operations and public opinion, planning and training for media presence is essential. Army leaders must accept that media representatives will accompany soldiers to

battle. Once they do, planning for the media becomes more realistic. This planning must also consider the "six truths" above. Looking at each individually will provide a framework for future Army public affairs operations.

### **Public Affairs Doctrine and Training**

*"Information operations are a totally unplowed field."* LTC Hiram Bell,  
Director, Army Public Affairs Agency<sup>6</sup>

Leveraging all the assets available to get the Army's message through the media will not and cannot take place without new doctrine for the information age and substantial training that starts in the earliest stages of a soldier's career. Aukofer and Lawrence recommend officers' education begin in the Reserve Officer Training Corps, where the ROTC unit shares a campus (or geographic area) with a journalism school.<sup>7</sup> The Army must consider such unique approaches to continually build improve upon relations with the media.

FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, is the keystone doctrinal manual that begins to integrate media and military operations, and recognizes the importance and validity of effective PA efforts on the battlefield. "C<sup>2</sup>W (command and control warfare), CA (civil affairs), and PA are the three operations the Army currently uses to gain and maintain information dominance and effective C<sup>2</sup>."<sup>8</sup> The linkage among FM 46-1, 100-5 and 100-6 demonstrates coordination heretofore absent in the PA arena. However, this new doctrine merely scratches the surface of the future inter-relationships among the key players of the media and the military. For this doctrine to be effective, leaders must incorporate the principles into training plans and exercises.



Instruction in media relations must assume a more prominent stature in enlisted and officer basic training courses and all subsequent schooling. For example, in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, students who will soon command battalions receive only four hours of media instruction. It was not until September 1996 that the Army offered a media instruction course to train officers heading directly into command at the battalion or brigade level.<sup>9</sup> In units, "conditions" for all appropriate tasks should specify "operations in a media environment." All exercises must include media operations, or at least the consideration of how media reports and reporters could affect operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center currently conducts some of the Army's most realistic media training, but this training need not be limited to Combat Training Center rotations.<sup>10</sup> Local commands have initiated low-cost programs to improve military-media operations.<sup>11</sup> Training and education produces soldiers of all ranks and skills capable of escorting media in the units. By leveraging the available knowledge and credibility of all the Army's soldiers, current PA forces can accomplish the tasks required of them in FM 46-1, 100-5, 100-6 and 101-5.<sup>12</sup>

### **Public Affairs Forces**

*"When major conflicts occur, the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning a high-ranking officer -- an admiral or a general -- to coordinate military/news media relationships in combat areas."*

Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team, The Odd Couple*<sup>13</sup>

As noted in the preceding chapter, Army public affairs personnel are sparse at the division level. The current authorization -- one major, a master sergeant, a photojournalist and a broadcaster -- cannot possibly support the 13-15 news media representatives

anticipated per division and still perform their planning and internal information functions.<sup>14</sup> As divisions become the basis of Joint Task Forces (JTF) for everything short of mid-intensity conflict (e.g. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia), public affairs personnel structure must increase, or public affairs responsibilities must decrease. This becomes especially true as JTFs begin to implement the provisions of FM 100-6 with regards to Information Operations Battle Staffs and Information Cells, which require PA staffing.<sup>15</sup>

PA doctrine does provide some relief to the embedded division PA section, the Public Affairs Detachment (PAD).<sup>16</sup> This five-person team, commanded by a captain, is often habitually associated with a division.<sup>17</sup> Typically, the PAD is assigned to a post that hosts a division. There are several exceptions. Of the 12 active duty PADs, only seven support a co-located division.<sup>18</sup> This arrangement is compounded by several things. First, the highest ranking PA professional at division level, even with typical augmentation is a major, often a captain -- the junior staff officer among all the personal and special staffs.<sup>19</sup> This places the PAO at a disadvantage when dealing with commanders and other staff officers. One of the current initiatives underway at the Public Affairs Proponent Activity is to increase the grade structure to provide each division with a lieutenant colonel and each corps with a colonel, enabling an officer of greater experience and authority to steer the increasingly complex PA operations.<sup>20</sup> But no matter how experienced that one officer may be, clearly additional help is needed.

Another, more pervasive problem is that although most PADs are located with or near a division, they are not divisional assets and may not accompany the division during a deployment. In times of increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO), these units often

rotate in and out of deployed media operations facilities, whether or not their habitually supported unit is participating in the deployment. This contributes to the third and most difficult staffing problem to overcome -- the "ad hoc" nature of all PA operations.<sup>21</sup> In a best case scenario, a division commander will have habitually worked with nine public affairs soldiers during field training exercises and deployments. These nine soldiers are capable of producing internal information products, and conducting PA planning and tactical operations center staffing. They will not be able to escort media representatives in the brigade areas, but can transport media representatives to subordinate elements.<sup>22</sup>

### **Pool Operations**

*"Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations."* DOD Directive 5122.5 (Change 3), Guidelines for Coverage of DOD Combat Operations<sup>23</sup>

For all military operations, the media pool presents unique challenges. By charter, it thrusts roughly a dozen reporters, of varying news media, into the first waves of combat. At the tactical level, it can mean losing trucks or helicopters to transport and support the pool. At the operational and strategic levels, activation of the pool risks losing operational security and surprise. There are two ways to counteract the impact of the DOD News Media Pool: allowing reporters already in the area of operations to cover military operations, and "embedding" media representatives into the units prior to deployment. The first way of diminishing the pool's impact is to not deploy them when sufficient news media representatives are currently in the area of operations. In Panama, prior to Operation Just Cause, the worsening political situation drew dozens of journalists

to the area well before military action. Instead of deploying the Washington correspondents with the forces, arrangements could be made with the reporters on the ground to cover the operations. In an extremely remote case where the media was not in country (Saudi Arabia is one, not because of austerity, but legal issues), the pool must deploy early enough to cover the earliest possible actions.

While the thought of herding the media into a pool seems an attractive way of controlling reporters, consider this:

The pool concept, as developed and implemented so far, mostly addresses military concerns and not the media's. In addition, the pool concept is cumbersome and limits improvisation. It is cumbersome because it requires enormous logistical support--in terms of personnel, transport, accommodations, and communications. Experience has shown that the military cannot easily meet those requirements. Indeed, public affairs logistics derives from operational logistics. In the priorities of a commander, public affairs always are a lower priority than operations. Moreover, logistical support can only be devoted to public affairs if planning has occurred soon enough and has developed without problems.<sup>24</sup>

However, this argument in no way implies completely free access to operations.

"Free" access must be a relative term when applied to coverage of military operations.

Combelles-Siegel provides a succinct (though largely unnecessary) warning for commanders:

As any military commander hopes to minimize the number of uncontrolled variables on the battlefield to limit the extent to which the Clausewitzian concept of friction can affect operations, allowing reporters onto battlefields without any control over numbers or activities is a sub-optimum (at best) choice from a military perspective.<sup>25</sup>

The optimum approach, then, is neither pooling nor free access. In an attempt to take advantage of the media's technological capabilities -- and the proven inability of the Joint Information Bureau to accommodate the media's needs -- recent deployments have "embedded" reporters in units. In Bosnia, 24 different media organizations placed 33

reporters in 15 units one week before deployment. The media representatives traveled to Bosnia with the units and stayed with the units for an additional two or three weeks.<sup>26</sup>

According to Moskos and Ricks, embedding represents a new page in military-media relations. (Table 5-1).

Table 5-1. Trends in Military-Media Relations

Military-Media Variable	Operations other Than War***	Post-Vietnam**	Pre-Vietnam*
When Story Begins	Media Arrive	Troops Arrive	Shooting starts
Attitude of Military Toward Press	Apprehensive	Hostile	Friendly
Military Control of Media	Low	Medium	High
Media Access to Military	Intermittent	Pools	Part of Unit
Focus on Civilian Entities, e.g. NGOs, Inter-agencies, Contract Civilians	High	Medium	Low
Media Perception of Military Relationship	Courted	Manipulated	Incorporated
When Story Ends	Media Go Home	Troops Go Home	Shooting Stops

\* e.g. World War II, Korean War

\*\* e.g. Grenada, Panama, Gulf War

\*\*\* e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia<sup>27</sup>

While this chart labels the new column “Operations other than war,” the concept is applicable across the gamut of military operations.

### **Technology = Access**

*“There is no way you can win this war without a high degree of trust between the leadership and the led, and you can get this best, I think, by laying it out there as it is.” Dan Rather<sup>28</sup>*

*“Increased information generation and handling capabilities affect every echelon of Army operations. ... An identical reduction in speed of information*

*exchange enhances the potential influence of the media on operations.*" FM 100-5, Operations, Preliminary Draft, October 27, 1996<sup>29</sup>

One of the greatest ironies of news reporting is that just because there is no story does not imply there will be no newscast or no paper. This contradiction can significantly impact the commander who intends to stonewall the press by not affording any access. At least three potential scenarios are possible. First, the media in the area of operations would write stories speculating about the nature of the operations they have been denied access to (although commanders may limit access to units or certain operations, complete banishment from the theater is unlikely). Second, reporters find unofficial sources, both in the theater and in Washington, to provide information about the operations. The third scenario would see reporters seeking access to combat along side the adversary's forces. In all these cases, the communications systems used to distribute these stories would be out of any chain of security review of U.S. forces. In the first instance, no actual information had been supplied by the military. In the second and third, the reports would originate outside the theater. Compared to allowing accredited media the opportunity to present a more balanced report based on unit and commander interviews, these options are particularly unpalatable.

The high-speed communications of the GIE in the hands of media representatives does not have to mean operational security violations. Reporters have proven themselves to be trustworthy in numerous cases involving prior access to classified plans, the most recent of which being Haiti.<sup>30</sup> The state of current media technological capabilities allows for near-real time broadcasts from remote locations -- this is a given. Improved technology in telephoto lenses, commercially available satellite imagery as well as satellite broadcast equipment can provide reporters access to virtually any where in the world. Army commanders must recognize this fact, and like it or not, provide access to the media

representatives in their area. The Army must also acquire high-tech systems in order to support the pool and those media representatives without communications gear. These systems will also improve communications with the Army's internal audiences.

As discussed previously, this is not "free" access to the extent that the reporter roams about the area freely, but that reasonable requests for interviews and inclusion during briefings are honored by the command. All information gathered by the reporter is subject to a security review *at the source*. By securing at the source, the commander affords the media the opportunity to provide timely news to America (and, possibly, the world) but without the potential for security lapses. This effort will require critical observation by a member (or members) of the unit, but offers the most balanced, timely method of reportage of military operations.

### **The Final Tool: Leadership**

*"A military commander who thoroughly understands the media's influence on his area of operations has the capability of better employing his resources and accomplishing his mission."*<sup>31</sup>

*"All leaders must understand that the perception of an operation can be as important to success as the execution of the operation."* "Vision 2000, Public Affairs into the 21st Century"<sup>32</sup>

When all the discussion about the media environment -- and its place in the GIE and MIE -- is done, leaders at all levels must accept the existence of the media on the modern battlefield. As shown previously in this monograph, Army leaders must provide the resources -- including manpower, dollars, doctrine, equipment and training -- in order to improve the Army's half of military-media relations. Leaders at the tactical level must recognize the power the media wields in forming public opinion (or at least printed opinion), and must prepare themselves to function alongside the media during all operations.<sup>33</sup> Many techniques have been offered by both the military and media. For

senior and field grade leaders, among the most noteworthy are offered in "Vision 2000"<sup>34</sup> and in Charles Ricks, "The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward."

**Define the critical PA responsibilities and functions.** Leaders must understand and exploit the capabilities of PA. "Organizing the media relations mission requires the same disciplined planning as any other operational task."<sup>35</sup>

**Educate leaders on the significance of public affairs.** Integrate PA principles, tactics, techniques and procedures into exercises and training. "Both the military and the news media share an interest in providing a more complete picture of military operations than is available at a news briefing."<sup>36</sup>

**Provide PA training for soldiers, Department of the Army civilians and family members** (as requested). Develop guides for media relations. "Efforts to reduce the fear and distrust of journalists are far more useful than those that reinforce the myth that the role of the news media is to undermine the military effort ..."<sup>37</sup>

**Coordinate the integration of PA with combat camera, psychological operations and civil affairs.** Eliminate duplication, synergize systems.

**Have the commander be the unit spokesman.** The single most effective approach to media relations is to have the commander act as his own spokesman.<sup>38</sup>

The preliminary draft of FM 100-5 recommends a more basic approach to dealing with the media, and includes a nine-step checklist of "Media Guidelines." The guidelines include "never lie," "set firm ground rules," "understand the media," and "provide access," items which have been discussed in this monograph. The final guideline, "leverage PAO assets," ultimately tells it all: "Public affairs officers (PAO) should be key players during any military operation, but the commander remains the key to success in public affairs."<sup>39</sup>

## Summary

*"The operational commander must operate in an environment which is composed of an independent media. ... He must present the facts as he understands them, educate his personnel on the media, and educate the media as much as possible on his operations in order to provide the information necessary to allow the government and the people to weigh the costs and the value of an operation."<sup>40</sup>*

Commanders are the key to successful PA operations, and successful PA operations will contribute greatly to mission accomplishment. Army operations of the future will necessarily take place in a media environment, and commanders must overcome the shortage of public affairs personnel by leveraging their own soldiers' knowledge and



familiarity of the unit's mission. With thorough PA training from the basic courses through the entire career, each soldier becomes capable of communicating effectively with media representatives.

In an age of instant, worldwide communications, security at the source will accommodate both the military's need for security and the media's desire for immediacy. "Embedded" media representatives will join units days or weeks before deployments and remain with the units until either the soldiers or the reporters are finished. But ultimately, commanders will resource the interaction among soldiers and the press. And strong leadership and trust are essential to successful military operations in a media environment.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Moskos and Ricks, 41.

<sup>2</sup> Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 256-7.

<sup>3</sup> Department of the Army. *Information Operations*, Field Manual 100-6, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August, 1996), Glossary-6. The global information environment consists of "all individuals, organizations, or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities, that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences." This definition, broadly applied, includes all media activity. While one tends to associate "information operations" with 21st century warfare, clearly reporters collected and disseminated information to audiences during the Civil War.

<sup>4</sup> Charles W. Ricks, "The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 December 1993), vi.

<sup>5</sup> FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Final Draft, 1 November 1996, 8.

<sup>6</sup> Hiram Bell, LTC, USA, Director, Army Public Affairs Proponency Activity (PAPA), interview by author, Fort Meade, Md., 4 December 1996.

<sup>7</sup> Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship between the Media and the Military*, (Nashville, Tenn.: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 55. Lawrence is a retired vice-admiral.

<sup>8</sup> FM 100-6, 2-4.

<sup>9</sup> Bell interview, The course includes time for mock media interviews.

<sup>10</sup> This training can be conducted or assisted by local PA units or assigned personnel. The Joint Readiness Training Center conducts some of the most rigorous PA training, and the PA Office there has produced an exportable packet of tasks, ground rules, role-playing, etc., for conducting "media on the battlefield" training. See "Media on the Battlefield" Training Packet, (Ft. Polk, La.: Joint Readiness Training Center, revised 12 July 1993.) See also "Media on the Battlefield," *Soldiers*, October 1993, 21-22.

<sup>11</sup> Carl E. Fischer, "Doing Battle with the Media," *KORUS*, April 1995, 20-25.

<sup>12</sup> According to LTC Bell, the Director of PAPA, there are several training initiatives underway. One is: Department of the Army, *The Army Universal Task List*. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 11-XX, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, still in draft). The pamphlet includes tasks and subtasks for commanders and public affairs organizations. Another effort is Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-07, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, draft), which will be the first joint doctrinal manual for public affairs. It is due out in the second quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. Another is the inclusion of three PA tasks into the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Common Core initiative, integrating basic PA skills into commissioned officer, warrant officer and senior noncommissioned officer training. This training includes requiring officers in their basic courses to "participate in a media interview." Bell interview, 4 December 1996.

<sup>13</sup> Aukofer and Lawrence, 53.

<sup>14</sup> See Ricks, 10 and n. 12. The number is based on "three reporters per ground maneuver brigade and three for other divisional units and the headquarters." (13).

<sup>15</sup> FM 100-6, D-0 and D-1. In both Haiti and Bosnia, PA personnel were included in information cells.

<sup>16</sup> FM 46-1, April 1986, p. 20, 21. July 1992, p. 2-23, 2-24, 2-28, 2-29.

<sup>17</sup> "Enhanced" PA sections and PADs are planned, increasing the number to seven and eight, respectively. These changes will be included in the April 1997 Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Also, TRADOC's "Warfighting Lens Analysis (WFLA) has recognized that PA equipment needs are a priority. However, inclusion in a TOE and "recognition" does not put soldiers or equipment in units. While it is clear things are looking brighter for public affairs, more is needed. Bell interview, 4 December 1996.

<sup>18</sup> Taken from a briefing presentation provided by the Public Affairs Proponent Activity, LTC Hiram Bell, Director, dated October 1996. The seven are: Ft. Drum (10th), Ft. Campbell (101st), Ft. Bragg (82nd), Ft. Stewart (3rd), Ft. Hood (2) (1st Cav and 4th Inf), and Hawaii, where the 25th is supported from Fort Derussey. The remaining five are at Forts Lewis (I Corps), Polk (JRTC), Riley, Carson and Richardson. These latter three represent former division headquarters, a potential source of PA assets to the forward-deployed divisions (the 2d Inf. in Korea and the 1st Inf. and 1st Ar. in Germany). Overseas, there are no PA units larger than embedded staff (Hawaii and Alaska excluded).

<sup>19</sup> See Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for U.S. mechanized and Armored divisions. Although authorized majors, the officer distribution plan allows filling the positions with captains if majors are not available in all but the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Divisions.

<sup>20</sup> Hiram Bell, LTC, USA, Director, Army Public Affairs Proponency Activity (PAPA), interview by the author, 17 October 1996.

<sup>21</sup> "Reporting the Next War," 43-44. Ethiel explains that the ad hoc nature of PA operations also places it at the "absolute bottom of the military feeding chain" for resources.

<sup>22</sup> FM 46-1, Final Draft, 1 November 1996, 49.

<sup>23</sup> FM 46-1, Final Draft, 1 November 1996, 63.

<sup>24</sup> Combelles-Siegel, 14, 16.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, 27.

<sup>26</sup> Moskos and Ricks, 24.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>28</sup> Dan Rather, quoted in "The Military and the Media: The Continuing Dialogue," ed. Nancy Ethiel, (Chicago: The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1993), 22.

<sup>29</sup> Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5, Preliminary Draft, October 27, 1996, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1996), I-9. Although this manual is not yet published, and may change substantially before publication, the excerpts taken from it reflect a changing attitude about the media that at least the authors share.

<sup>30</sup> See Combelles-Siegel, 35, Charles W. Ricks, 22 and "Reporting the Next War," 28.

<sup>31</sup> Susan P. Kellet-Forsyth, "The Media and the Operational Commander: A Shotgun Marriage," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1994), 44.

<sup>32</sup> Department of the Army, "Vision 2000, Public Affairs into the 21st Century," (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, 1994), 9.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen Badsey, in "Modern Military Operations and the Media," discusses at length the limitations to the media's ability to influence public opinion. In the book, *Effective Public Relations*, Scott Cutlip, Allen Center and Glen Broom delve even further into public opinion. The bottom line is that changing opinions is not nearly as easy as airing a story on CNN. This subject is as fascinating as it is controversial (some contend the "CNN effect" and CNN in general dictate world opinion.) However, there isn't room to discuss this issue here. Suffice it to say that while the media influence people, a news report implication is not widely accepted until individuals compare and contrast the implication with personal beliefs, opinions, behaviors and attitudes.

<sup>34</sup> "Vision 2000, 8-17.

<sup>35</sup> Charles W. Ricks, 20.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>38</sup> LTC Hiram Bell, the Director of PAPA sees it as a matter of credibility. "Credibility is tied to the leadership of the operation. In today's environment, functioning as the organization's chief communicator may be a leader's most important function. Bell interview, 4 December 1996.

<sup>39</sup> FM 100-5, *Operations*, Preliminary Draft, October 27, 1996, V-3-10, V-3-11.

<sup>40</sup> James G. Diehl, "Lights! Camera! Action! The Operational Commander and the Media," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 39.

## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

Military-media relations will continue to provide ample fodder for discussions, disagreements and arguments for the foreseeable future. The deeply-held myth that the media is out to expose the military will not be easily overcome, partially because the media *will* expose the military's unethical or unfair practices and partly because Army officers continue to hold on to Vietnam. As Americans, military leaders value the free press and the checks and balances it provides with respect to business and government. As officers, those same leaders are sworn to uphold the Constitution, including the First Amendment.

America's Army has never been especially well-equipped for dealing with the media, neither logistically nor professionally. The threadbare public affairs offices and units cannot perform all that is asked of them in information age warfare. Officers, sworn to protect their soldiers from the harm that can result from failure to maintain operational surprise, must be trained to protect those soldiers and let the public know how well they are doing. In the years since the end of the draft, fewer and fewer journalists and Congressmen have served in the Army. The media offers an opportunity to improve America's understanding of the Army, as well as improve the public image of the institution.<sup>1</sup>

Initiatives spearheaded by the Army's Public Affairs Proponent Activity coupled with a general recognition of the significance information operations, have begun to narrow the technological, personnel, doctrine and training shortfalls endemic of Army public affairs. But even these first steps must be accepted by the force. Any momentum

public affairs operations have developed recently must continue. For PA efforts to succeed, Army leadership must personally take and show an interest in media operations, first by resourcing public affairs, then by developing and promoting PA training and education from a soldier's first days in service. Soldiers must internalize the concepts presented herein and attempt to support the media in accordance with DOD Directive 5122.5. Working with the media is no longer a task for only those who get stuck with it either by position or military occupation. Current operations have demonstrated that all soldiers are spokesmen for the Army.

Within the global and military information environments lies the media environment. While the military cannot control the media environment, it can be affected by media reports and the opinions they change. This monograph has argued that the best way to deal with the media is honestly and forthrightly. While security remains a commander's issue, potential security concerns can be attenuated at the source. Pools are not the answer to fair coverage, operational security, nor PA logistics. In fact, pools may be the worst solution in all these areas. PA planning must be performed in parallel with operational planning to ensure that the PA solution and impact are known to the commander prior to commencement.

Ultimately, the commander must ensure that he and his soldiers are as prepared to meet the media as they are to meet other battlefield challenges. With training and education, commanders can make public affairs a credible force multiplier without sacrificing security or personal and professional ethics. More importantly, commanders can use public affairs to communicate information to soldiers, families and the world. The

Army's mission is first to deter aggression then to defeat an undeterred enemy. Public affairs can assist in both phases of that mission, but not without the full support and resourcing of the commander.

As the Army looks forward into the 21st Century, Army public affairs must rely heavily on the support and education of non-public affairs personnel to integrate the effects of the media into mainstream Army operations. As the Army and its budget gets smaller, and cost-cutters seek the maximum "tooth-to-tail" ratio, chances are greater that the number of PA personnel will decrease than climb.<sup>2</sup> Even with the modest personnel increases proposed, PA soldiers will continue to struggle to perform the increased requirements of information operations if not relieved of "keeping the media out of the commander's hair."

For the Army to receive the return on its investment in public affairs, leaders at all levels must inculcate these concepts into the force. Only then will public affairs in the 21st century be a force multiplier.

<sup>1</sup> Bell interview, 4 December 1996. LTC Bell went on to state that this represents more than just the matter of a story not being told. He suggested that consistent coverage "in the bank" helped the Army weather stories like the scandal at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

<sup>2</sup> The pamphlet, "Force of Decision ... Capabilities for the 21st Century," a Department of the Army publication, dated April 15, 1996, states the budget has decreased 38 percent, personnel 35 percent, while Army missions increased 300 percent. (p. 13)

## Appendix A

### CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel) Recommendations<sup>1</sup>

1. That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the majority of cases by implementing the following:
  - a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.
  - b. When sending implementing orders to commanders in chief in the field, direct CINC planners to include considerations of public information aspects.
  - c. Inform Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) [ASD(PA)] of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should come from the Secretary of Defense.
  - d. Complete the plan, concurrently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in OJCS [Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.
  - e. Insofar as possible and appropriate, institutionalize these steps in written guidance or policy.
2. When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.
3. That, in connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or establish a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.
4. That the basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines to ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation.
5. Public affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

6. Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to news media.
7. Planning factors should include provisions for intra- and inter-theater transportation support of the media.
8. To improve media-military understanding and cooperation:
  - a. CJCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual news organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.
  - b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service schools and colleges, to include media participation when possible.
  - c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations.
  - d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is a real time or near real time news media audio-visual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle.



## Appendix B

### Review of the Panama Pool Deployment (Hoffman Report) Recommendations<sup>2</sup>

1. The Secretary of Defense should issue a policy directive, to be circulated throughout the Department and Armed services, stating explicitly his official sponsorship of the media pool and requiring full support of it. That policy statement should make it clear to all that the pool must be given every assistance to report combat by U.S. troops from the start of the operations.
2. All operational plans drafted by the joint staff must have an annex spelling out measures to assure that the pool will move with the lead elements of U.S. forces and cover the earliest stages of the operations. The principle should be incorporated in overall public affairs plans.
3. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should closely monitor development of operation-related public affairs plans to assure they fulfill all requirements for pool coverage. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should review all such plans. In advance of military actions those plans should be briefed to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with the operations plans.
4. In a runup to a military operation, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should send out a message ordering all commanders to give full cooperation to the media pool and its escorts. Its requirement should be spelled out unambiguously and should reach down through all echelons in the chain of command. Such a message should make clear that necessary resources, such as helicopters, ground vehicles, communications, etc., must be earmarked specifically for pool use, that the pool must have ready access to the earliest action and that the safety of the pool must not be used as a reason to keep the pool from action.
5. The ASD(PA) must be prepared to weigh in aggressively with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman when necessary to overcome any secrecy or other obstacles blocking prompt deployment of the pool to the scene of action.
6. After the pool has been deployed, the ASD(PA) must be kept informed in a timely fashion of any hitches that may arise. He must be prepared to act immediately, to contact the JCS Chairman, the joint staff director of operations and other senior officers who can serve to break through any obstacles to the pool. The ASD(PA) should call on the Defense Secretary for help as needed.
7. The ASD(PA) should study the proposal by several of the Panama poolers that future pools deploy in two sections. The first section would be very small and include only reporters and photographers. The second section, coming later, would bring in supporting gear, such as satellite uplink equipment.

8. The national media pool should never again be herded as a single unwieldy unit. It should be broken up after arriving at the scene of action to cover a wider spectrum of the story and then be reassembled periodically to share the reporting results.
9. The pool should be exercised at least once during each quarterly rotation with airborne and other types of military units most likely to be sent on emergency combat operations.
10. During deployments, there should be regular briefings for pool newsmen and newswomen by senior operations officers so the poolers will have an up-to-date and complete overview of the progress of an operation they are covering.
11. There is an urgent need for the restructuring of the organization which has the responsibility for handling pool reports sent to the Pentagon for processing distribution. The ASD(PA) must assure that there is adequate staffing and enough essential equipment to handle the task. The director of plans, so long as he has this responsibility, should clearly assign contingency duties among his staff to ensure timely handling of reports from the pool. Staffers from the Administration Office, Community Relations and other divisions of ASD(PA) should be mobilized to help in such a task as needed.
12. The ASD(PA) should give serious consideration to a suggestion by some of the pool members to create a new pool slot for an editor who would come to the Pentagon during a deployment to lend professional journalism help to the staff officers handling pool reports. Such a pool editor could edit copy, question content where indicated and help expediate the distribution of reports.
13. The pool escorting system needs overhaul as well. There is no logical reason for the Washington-based escorts to be drawn from the top of the ASD(PA) Plans division. The head of that division should remain in Washington to oversee getting out the pool products.
14. The ASD(PA) should close a major gap in the pool system by requiring all pool participant organizations -- whether print, still photo, TV or radio -- to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry.
15. There is merit in a suggestion by one of the pool photographers that participating news organizations share the cost of the equipment, such as a portable dark room and a negative transmitter, which could be stored at Andrews AFB for ready access in a deployment. Other equipment essential for a smooth transmission of pool products, such as satellite up-link gear, might also be acquired and stored in the same manner.
16. All pool-assigned reporters and photographers, not only bureau chiefs, should attend quarterly Pentagon sessions where problems can be discussed and rules and responsibilities underscored.

17. Public Affairs Officers from unified commands should meet periodically with pool assigned reporters and photographers with whom they might have to work in some future crisis.

Appendix C  
DOD Principles of Information<sup>3</sup>

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles of information will apply:

1. Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.
2. A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.
3. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
4. Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
5. The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in the defense public affairs program.

## Appendix D

### Statement of DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations<sup>4</sup>

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of all U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24-36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for special events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violations of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone for the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restriction may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft when feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will provide public affairs officers with the facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electronic operations security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

Note: The news media industry proposed a tenth principle, denying the military a security review process, but it was rejected by DOD. On occasion, the media remind DOD of their failure to include "all" the principles.

## Appendix E

### U.S. Wartime Press Censorship Documents from World War I<sup>5</sup>

(Committee on Public Information's December 1917 Voluntary Censorship Restrictions)

The following is the text of the Committee on Public Information's voluntary censorship restrictions issued in December 1917:

#### **The New Requests in Full**

The desires of the Government with respect to the concealment from the enemy of military policies, plans and movements are set forth in the following specific requests. They go to the press of the United States directly from the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and represent the thought and advice of their technical advisors. They do not apply to news dispatches censored by military authority with the Expeditionary Forces or in those cases where the Government itself, in the form of official statements, may find it necessary or expedient to make public information covered by these requests.

For the protection of our military and naval forces and of merchant shipping it is requested that secrecy be observed in all matters of:

1. Advance information of the routes and schedules of troop movements. (See paragraph 5.)
2. Information tending to disclose the number of troops in the Expeditionary Forces abroad.
3. Information calculated to disclose location of the permanent base or bases abroad.
4. Information that would disclose the location of American units or the eventual position of the American forces at the front.

#### **Ports of Embarkation**

5. Information tending to disclose an eventual or actual port of embarkation; or information of the movement of military forces toward seaports or of the assembling of military forces at seaports from which interference might be drawn of any intention to embark them for service abroad; and information of the assembling of transports or convoys; and information of the embarkation itself.

6. Information of the arrival at any European port of American war vessels, transports, or any other portion of any expeditionary force, combatant or noncombatant.

7. Information of the time of departure of merchant ships from American or European ports, or information of the ports from which they sailed, or information of their cargoes.

8. Information indicating the port of arrival of incoming ships from European ports or after their arrival indicating, or hinting at, the port at which the ships arrived.

9. Information as to convoys and as to the sighting of friendly or enemy ships, whether naval or merchant.

10. Information of the locality, number, or identity of vessels belonging to our Navy or to the navies of any country at war with Germany.

11. Information of the coast or anti-aircraft defenses of the United States. Any information of their very existence, as well as the number, nature, or position of their guns, is dangerous.

### **Mines and Harbor Defenses**

12. Information on the laying of mines or mine fields or of any harbor defenses.

13. Information of the aircraft and appurtenances used at Government aviation schools for experimental tests under military authority, and information of contracts and production of air material, and information tending to disclose the numbers and organization of the air division, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.

14. Information of all Government devices and experiments in war material, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.

15. Information of secret notices issued to mariners or other confidential instructions issued by the Navy or Department of Commerce relating to lights, lightships, buoys, or other guides to navigation.

16. Information as to the number, size, character, or location of ships of the Navy ordered laid down at any port or shipyard, or in actual process of construction; or information that they are launched or in commission.

17. Information of the train or boat schedules of traveling official missions in transit through the United States.

18. Information of the transportation of munitions, or of war material.

### **Photographs**



Photographs conveying the information specified above should not be published.

These requests go to the press without larger authority than the necessities of the war-making branches. Their enforcement is a matter of the press itself. To the overwhelming proportion of newspapers, who have given unselfish, patriotic adherence to the voluntary agreement, the Government extends its gratitude and high appreciation.

## Appendix F

Excerpts from "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information" (Vietnam) (31 October 1966 and 29 March 1967)\*<sup>6</sup>

The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam].

1. Future plans, operations or strikes.
2. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, names of operations and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside the RVN [Republic of Vietnam].
8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target areas. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
9. Identity and units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-aircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)
12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR [search and rescue] operations are in progress.
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

\* Note: These excerpts are contained as an inclosure to a 27 March 1968 "Memorandum for the Press" entitled "Interpretation of Ground Rules," signed by BG Winant Sidle, the Chief of Information, summarizing and simplifying the previous guidance.

Appendix G  
Operation Desert Storm Media Ground Rules<sup>7</sup>

The following information should not be reported, because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

1. For U.S. or coalition unit, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies such as artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water, including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number and amount of supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
2. Any information that reveals details of force plans, operations or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.
3. Information, photography or imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined, "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," and so on. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region, unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
4. Rules of engagement details.
5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods and results.
6. During an operation, specific information of friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security and lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations and size of friendly forces involved, until released by USCENTCOM.
7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier based.
8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct or indirect fire, intelligence collection or security measures.
9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
10. Special operations' forces methods, unique equipment, or tactics.

11. Specific operating methods and tactics, such as air operations angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics or evasive maneuvers. General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by USCENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."



## ***Public Affairs***

*PA Detachment: SRC 45500L*



### MISSION

- Augments deployed division and separate brigade PA assets supporting combined or unified operations.

### CAPABILITIES

- Produces command information newspapers and fact sheets.
- Facilitates media in support of division/separate brigade PAO.
- Provides print, photojournalistic and electronic news coverage.

### PAD TOTALS

- COMPO 1: 12
- COMPO 2: 6
- COMPO 3: 4



## ***Public Affairs***

*PA Detachment: SRC 45500L*



### COMPOSITION

PAD		
CPT	Commander	46A
SSG	PA NCO	46Q
SPC	Journalist	46Q
SPC	Broadcast Journalist	46R
PFC	Journalist	46Q





## Public Affairs

Mobile PA Detachment: SRC 45413L



### MISSION

- Provide PA support to a deployed echelons above division.
- Support Civil Affairs operations.

### CAPABILITIES

- Gathers and produces command information print, photographic, audio and video products.
- Facilitates media in roles of escort and provider of public information products.

### MPAD TOTALS

- COMPO 1: 1
- COMPO 2: 23
- COMPO 3: 17




## Public Affairs

Mobile PA Detachment: SRC 45413L



### COMPOSITION





## Public Affairs

Broadcast PA Detachment: SRC 45500L



### MISSION

➤ Establish and sustain radio broadcast operation from fixed and mobile facilities at unified command level.

### CAPABILITIES

- Provides continuous command information broadcasts.
- Provides limited newsgathering for command information and media relations missions.
- Serves as entertainment source for troops in theater.

### BPAD TOTALS

- COMPO 1: 0
- COMPO 2: 0
- COMPO 3: 3



## Public Affairs

Broadcast PA Detachment: SRC 45500L



### COMPOSITION

#### COMMAND CELL

MAJ	Commander	46B
CPT	Ops Officer	46A
CPT	Broadcast Officer	46B
SFC	Detachment Sgt	46R
SGT	Supply Sgt	92Y
SPC	Admin Support	75B

TEAM A			TEAM B			MAINTENANCE TEAM		
SSG	Broadcast NCO	46R	SSG	Broadcast NCO	46R	SSG	Senior Repair NCO	25R
SGT	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SGT	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SGT	Repair NCO	25R
SGT	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SGT	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SGT	Repair NCO	25R
SPC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SPC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SPC	Repair Spec	25R
SPC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SPC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	SPC	Repair Spec	25R
PFC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	PFC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	PFC	Repair Spec	25R
PFC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	PFC	Broadcast Journalist	46R	PFC	Repair Spec	25R







## Public Affairs

Press Camp Headquarters: SRC 45423L



### MISSION

- Operate news media centers at corps and echelons above corps.
- Provide media support services and limited logistical support to media representatives.
- Provide command information support to public affairs elements within the theater.

### CAPABILITIES

- Implements news media accreditation programs.
- Conducts news briefings, conferences and escorts media.
- Serves as clearinghouse for military public affairs products and oversees command information programs.

### PCH TOTALS

- COMPO 1: 0
- COMPO 2: 3
- COMPO 3: 4



## Public Affairs

Press Camp Headquarters: SRC 45423L



### COMPOSITION

#### COMMAND CELL

LTC	Commander	46A
MAJ	XO	46A
MAJ	PAO	46A
SGM	CH PAO NCO	46Z
SFC	PA NCO	46Q
SGT	Supply SGT	92Y
SPC	Mechanic	63B
SPC	Admin Spec	71L
SPC	Personnel Spec	75B
PFC	Admin Clerk	71L

#### AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION

SSG	Broadcast NCO	46R
SPC	Production Spec	25V
SPC	Broadcast Spec	46R

#### MEDIA ESCORT

MAJ	Chief	46A
CPT	Press Officer	46A
CPT	Press Officer	46A
SGT	Journalist	46Q
SGT	Journalist	46Q
SPC	Journalist	46Q
SPC	Journalist	46Q
PFC	Journalist	46Q
PFC	Journalist	46Q


#### BRIEFING

MAJ	Chief	46A
CPT	Brief Officer	46A
CPT	Brief Officer	46A
SGT	Brief Journalist	46R
SPC	Brief Journalist	46R
PFC	Brief Journalist	46R





## Public Affairs - AC MTOE United States




## Public Affairs - AC MTOE Embedded MTOE Structure



➤ Structure varies among 39 different TOE configurations from 16 soldiers to one soldier

➤ 67% of MTOE embedded in units (155 authorizations)


➤ 33% of MTOE in "stand alone" PA units (78 MPAD/PAD authorizations)




Embedded Grade Structure in PA MTOE Units

	05	04	03	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E3
TAACOM	1	1	1	1				1	1	1
CORPS	1	1		1				1	1	1
DIVISION		1	1	1	1				1	1
BRIGADE								1		

## Public Affairs - AC MTOE Overseas




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
## Public Affairs - USAR

### Mobile PA Detachments



## Public Affairs - USAR


### Public Affairs Detachments






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### *Broadcast PA Detachments*



## *Public Affairs - ARNG*


### *Press Camp Headquarters*






## Public Affairs - ARNG

### Mobile PA Detachments



## Public Affairs - ARNG

### Public Affairs Detachments



Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Schiller, 25-26.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 27-29.

<sup>3</sup> Field Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*, Final Draft, 1 November 1996, 62.

<sup>4</sup> Schiller, 30.

<sup>5</sup> Aswell, 151-153.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>7</sup> Schiller, 32-33.

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